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Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics:
The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family

JANET L. DOLGIN"
I. INTRODUCTION

An advertisement, placed in elite university newspapers, offered
$50,000 for the ova of tall, smart women.1 Hundreds of university students
answered the advertisement which specified that applicants be at least 5'
10" tall (1.75 meters) and have college board scores of at least 1400? Interviewed on Central News Network (CNN), the lawyer for the couple who
placed the advertisement explained that the intending parents were themselves tall and smart, and thus, understandably wanted tall, smart children?
Apparently anxious not to leave the wrong impression, the lawyer clarified:
"Let me point out," he explained,' "this child will be loved, no matter if it's
short, tall, smart or not so smarL A
The lawyer invoked two assumptions about families. The law has come
widely to rely on each assumption in defining and regulating familial matters. First, families can be created at home or in the marketplace. The
once sacrosanct distinction between home and workS-between love and
money-has blurred. However, the implications of the lawyer's second
qualifying statement seem to conflict with the implications of his first
statement. Those who negotiate bargains in the marketplace insist on getting that for which they bargained. Yet, the lawyer explained that the cou* Maurice A. Deane Professorof Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. (philosophy).
BarnardCollege; MA, Ph.D. (anthropology), Princeton University; JD., Yale Law SchoL A paper
based on this
article mas delivered at Kings College, University of Cambridge (Conference on Genetics, Identity and Responsibility), July 1999. 1 am grateful to Connie S.Lenz Assstsant Director.
Maurice A. Deane Law Library,Hofstra University School of Law, for her Intelligent and geerous
bibliographicassistance.
1. See Irene Sege, A $50,000 Dilemmaon Campus, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1999, at Al.
2. See CNN TalkbackLive, Mar. 12, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nehs Library, CNN File.
3. Seeki.
4. Id.
5.See DAVID . SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 53-54 (1968) (contrasting home with work).
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pie who wanted a tall, smart child would love a short, dull child. Thus, the
lawyer invoked a second assumption. Once created, familial relationships
are distinct from relations in the marketplace. The law, reflecting society,
expects families to operate within a moral frame that prizes, even if it no
longer guarantees, love and enduring commitment. The couple will love
their child, even if it is short and dull because it will be their child.
The advertisement for Ivy League egg donors raises a related issue
about the constitution of families. Within the so-called traditional family,
relationships were understood as firmly grounded in inexorable biological
truths. The term "traditional family" refers here to a social construct,
forged in the early years of the Industrial Revolution. That family was
constructed as the cultural antithesis of the domain of commerce produced
by industrialization. It was understood as a domain of love and enduring
commitment, distinct in virtually every regard from the universe of commerce, bargained negotiation, and autonomous self-interest. Ironically, this
construct of family was actualized most firmly in the United States during
6
the 1950s, just before it was widely challenged by alternative constructs.
Within the traditional family, the nature of familial bonds was predi-8
cated on, and was understood to flow from shared biogenetic substance.
In the 1960s, anthropologist David M. Schneider explained that "[i]f science discovers new facts about biogenetic relationship, then that is what
kinshi? is and was all along, although it may not have been known at the
time." The advertisement for egg donors confirms the continuing truth of
that assertion in certain regards and disavows its truth in other regards.
The couple wanted a child that would resemble each of them. They relied
on understandings about biogenetic substance in seeking such a child. But
the ovum from which that child would develop would become theirs
through money and technology, not through natural or supernatural proc6. Anthropologist David M. Schneider, describing the American family at the middle of the twentieth century, referred to the familial arena as one of "enduring, diffuse solidarity." Id at 52. Schneider
explained:
Solidari, because the relationship is supportive, helpful, and cooperative; it rests on trust
and the other can be trusted. Diffuse because it is not narrowly confined to a specific goal or
a specific kind of behavior. Two athletes may cooperate and support each other for the duration of the game and for the purpose of winning the game, but be indifferent to each other
otherwise. Two members of the family cannot be indifferent to one another, and since their
cooperation does not have a specific goal or a specific limited time in mind, it is enduring.
AL
7. The so-called "traditional" family was constructed in the nineteenth century as a product of
modem capitalism. See JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE

COURSE INAMERICAN HISTORY 30-31 (1986).
8. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 23 (considering meaning of "blood relationship" as shared
"biogenetic substance" in American kinship); see also David M. Schneider, Kinship, Nationality,and
Religion in American Culture: Towarda Definition ofKinship, in SYMBOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY 63, 65
(Janet L. Dolgin et al. eds., 1977) (discussing common identity of blood relatives arising from "shared
physical substance").
9. SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 23.
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This article considers three broad contexts within which family law is
being asked to consider the consequences for families of "new facts about
biogenetic relationship." 0 The law's responses to these new facts suggest
that Schneider's conclusions about the biogenetic dimension of kinship
must be amended in characterizations of contemporary families. In particular, the monolithic ideology" of families that Schneider assumed at
mid-century 12 has been appropriated by various interests, which have misrepresented fragments of it in its entirety. As a result, society and the law
invoke certain aspects of the ideology of traditional families in some contexts, but not in others. Other aspects are forgotten almost completely in
deference to the contemporary obsession in the United States with the
preservation of liberty and choice. Specifically, families can be created
through love or money; they can be grounded in biology or intention; they
can include children created through donated gametes, children with several biological mothers, children who survived the choices attendant upon
genetic testing at the embryonic stage, or no children at all. Yet, it is
widely hoped, if not expected, that once formed, these families will resemble one another in placing love and loyalty before all else. Thus, those
presuming to favor tradition join those presuming to favor modernity in
invoking a similar goal--the actualization of affective, committed, familial
relationships.
At the same time, at the edges of the domestic arena, an unfamiliar
vision of family emerges. The "genetic" (or medicalized) family 3 abandons almost completely the presumption that familial relationships should
reflect the truths of a moral order. This vision of family represents a radical fragmentation of family ideology. It depends exclusively on biogenetic
substance (now "genes" rather than "blood") and expressly disavows that
that substance necessarily is, or should be, reflected in the character of social relationships among family members.
Section II of this article considers, respectively, the legal delimitations
10. Id.
11. The term "ideology" may include, but is not meant primarily to refer to, a political agenda. The
term as used here refers to the pervasive system of underlying, often unarticulated, assumptions about
how people act and about how people relate to themselves, other people, and the larger world. This
definition follows that found in the work of French anthropologist Louis Dumont:
Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not a distinction of matter but
one of point of view. We do not take as ideological What is left out when everything true,
rational, or scientific has been preempted. We take everything that is socially thought, believed, acted upon, on the assumption that it is a living whole, the interrelatedness and interdependence of whose parts would be blocked out by the a priori introduction of our current
dichotomies.
Lois DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLETO MARX 22 (1977).
12. See generallySCHNEIDER, supranote 5.
13. See KAJA FrnwcE, THE KIN INTHE GEE (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 13, on file with
author).
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facts. 14

In both sets of
of paternity and maternity that elide biological
cases, courts displace or expressly reject biological evidence in order to
safeguard social dimensions of a traditional model of family relationships.
In the cases involving disputes about paternity, courts ignore the results of
DNA testing in order to denominate as father, a child's mother's husband.
In these cases, courts, anxious to preserve a traditional view of family, refuse to admit DNA evidence that conflicts with that view. t5 Therein the law
relies on an old assumption about biology, intended once to substitute for
an unknown biological truth, in order to displace that very "truth." In the
cases involving disputes about maternity, all occasioned by reproductive
technology, the law displaces biological facts as it recognizes intention and
choice as fully productive of familial bonds. In these cases, courts invoke
traditional ends-the construction of affective family units-to justify decisions that cannot easily be harmonized with traditional assumptions about
the domestic arena. And, in these cases, courts privilege the social incidents of traditional family life over conflicting biological facts.
Section III of the article considers a startlingly different understanding
of families that is being constructed around new biogenetic facts. This
section presents an ideological construct of the "genetic family," as well as
the concept of personhood that it fosters. Next, this section reviews the
law's evolving response to the new genetics more generally. That response, while diverse in many regards, has uniformly focused on the flow
of genetic information as the essential subject of regulation. In delimiting
a duty-within a wide assortment of social contexts-to reveal or to refrain
from revealing genetic information, courts and legislatures begin to sketch
an emerging view of personhood both within families and elsewhere.
Section IV analyzes the shifting scope of the increasingly fragmented
ideological frame within which the law delimits and regulates diverse family constellations. This section also compares the law's understanding of
the notion of privacy within the context of the genetic family to legal understandings of privacy in other family contexts.
In short, this article reviews legal delimitations of paternity and maternity which ignore or elide contemporary understandings of the biological
facts of kinship. It then reviews a social construct of family, referred to
here as the "genetic family," and examines the law's elaboration of that
construct. Finally, the article delimits the challenge that the construct of
14. In each of the cases discussed, the moral and social implications of the biological facts are In
dispute. The facts themselves, though sometimes ignored, are not the subject ofdispute.

15. In some cases, the law has been ready to denominate the mother's husband as "father" even
though a biological father, willing to provide child support, has been or can easily be identified. See,
e.g., Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726, 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (refusing to admit evidence of
DNA analysis and identifying mother's husband as father, even though mother had commenced support
action against a third party on behalf of her son), afftd, 720 Ad 764 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1757 (1999). See infra notes 30-44 and accompanying text (analyzing Miscovlch).
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the genetic family poses to other constructs of family.
II. THE LAW DISPLACES BIOLOGY IN REGULATING FAMILIES

In the last decades of the twentieth century, United States courts, responding to a series of legal disputes about fathers and mothers, have
privileged tradition over modernity, but have simultaneously eroded tradition by predicating it on the ideological foundations of modernity-liberty
and choice. Professor Marilyn Strathern has captured this peculiarity:
[I]t would seem we cannot be at both ends of the continuum at the
same time. I want to suggest that is exactly where we might be.
The suggestion arises from an otherwise perplexing sensation.
This is the sense that there seems both more 'status' and more
'contract' around in the world, or at least in arguments about them.
have both more tradition
Would it also follow then that one might
6
and more modernity at the same time?
If American lawmakers examined the assumptions behind their own
decisions, they would answer Professor Strathern's question affirmatively.
Their decisions and rules suggest that it is possible to have both more tradition and more modernity precisely because (it is believed) modernity
increasingly equips people to construct the social order, and thus both tradition and modernity, however they choose.
A. The PaternalPresumption:Biology Notwithstanding
For centuries before the advent of reproductive technology and DNA
testing variously challenged or identified the biological correlates of the
parent-child relationship, courts determined paternity by relying on a presumption about biological facts. Under the common law, the husband of a
married woman was presumed to be the biological father of her child, and
was therein proclaimed that child's legal father.' 7 The presumption 8
elided the biological facts in an era in which they were unknowable. The
presumption did not apply to cases in which the mother's husband could
not have been the father of his wife's child-cases in which a man was
sterile, impotent, or, in Blackstone's words, "extra quatuor maria,[beyond
the four seas] for above nine months."' 9 The common law presumption
16. Marilyn Strathem, Enablingldentity? Biology Choice and the New Reproducthe Technologies,

in QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 37,45 (Stuart Hall & Paul Du Gay eds. 1996).
17. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 512 (1998).

18. The presumption has been widely adopted in statutory fonnulation and is still deiined in many
states as irrebuttable. See id.
19. 1 WjuAM BLACKSTONE, CO~MMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND $457 (J.Chitty ed.
1857). In England, neither the wife nor the husband could be a witness to prove the husband's lack of
access to the wife. See Michael H. v. Gerald D.,491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (describing common law
presumption of legitimacy).
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served ostensibly to protect children from the hardship of being defined as
illegitimate" and more21 generally, to promote the "'peace and tranquillity of
States and families."'

The presumption permitted courts to assume a set of biological facts
(and thus a history of relationships) in order to safeguard a traditional
model of family. Before the advent of paternity testing, courts were able to
apply the presumption without confronting biological evidence proving
that the presumption failed utterly to reflect the biological facts of paternity.22 As a result, the presumption rarely collided irrefutably with alternative facts. Sometimes, social facts suggested strongly that a woman's husband was not, indeed, the biological father of her child. Sometimes, presumably, the wife alone or the husband and wife knew for certain that the
husband was not the biological father of his wife's child. In such cases,
courts could put conflicting narratives to rest through application of the
presumption of paternity without facing a clear discontinuity between "legal" and "natural" paternity. That the presumption often constituted a legal
fiction was obvious, but, as a general matter, the fictive quality of the presumption was modulated by the possibility that the presumption's identification of a particular child's father did reflect biological facts.
Beginning in the fourth decade of the twentieth century, blood test
evidence became available in paternity cases.23 These early blood tests
served to exclude potential fathers, but did not present courts with evidence
24
that could determine the identity of a particular child's biological father.
Thus, for many years, the availability of paternity testing rarely discounted
completely the presumption that a woman's husband was her child's biological father. In short, reliance on the presumption continued to serve the
apparent interests of tradition. 25
20. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *455, *459 (declaring that an illegitimate child, or bas-

tard, "cannot be heir to any one, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body; for, being nulllusfillus,
he is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be derived").
21. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 125 (quoting JAMES SCHOULER, LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS §
225, at304 (3d ed. 1882)).
22. Under the common law, the presumption of paternity could be rebutted only by evidence that

the husband was incapable of procreation or that he was apart from his wife during the probable period
of conception. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. However, "[n]either husband nor wife
[could] be a witness to prove access or nonaccess." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124-25 (quoting
SCHOULER, supra note 21, § 225, at 306).
23. See Mark Ira Ellman & David Kaye, Probabilitiesand Proof. Can HLA and Blood Group
Testing Prove Paternity?,54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1979).
24. See id, at 1135-36.

25. The law's contemporary response to artificial insemination is illustrative of the assimilation of
new technology to serve familiar interests. Since the 1960s, lawmakers have grounded the patemity of

a mother's husband on consent in cases involving artificial insemination. At present, the majority of
states in the United States have passed laws that permit and regulate artificial insemination. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-262, 45a-771 to 779 (1999);
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In the last decades of the twentieth century, "DNA

529
fingerprinting '

has enabled paternity testing with results approaching certainty?' Yet, the
advent of accurate paternity testing has not dislodged the common law
presumption about paternity. Often, the presumption has manifestly become a substitute for, rather than a presumption about, some underlying

biological reality. But, for the most part, the law has been reluctant to disclaim expressly the importance of paternity's biological underpinnings.
That is, in cases in which evidence of a man's biological paternity does not
harmonize with the law's preference as to legal paternity, evidence of bio-

logical paternity has been suppressed, rather than openly acknowledged
and then discounted.28

In short, in paternity cases--even cases inwhich legal paternity has
clearly differed from biological paternity-courts have quietly accepted
choice and its correlates as the arbiters of familial relationships, but have at
the same time, disguised that acceptance by insisting on the preeminence of
traditional familial forms. In this regard, the law's response to these cases

has differed from its response to cases occasioned by the new reproductive
technologies-cases in which choice not only serves tradition, but has itself become a centerpiece of the moral order.29
The law's struggle in paternity cases to preserve the fiction of an older

moral order-to presume (or at least contend) that legal truths reflect
"natural" truths-is increasingly beset with contradictions and ambivalence. That confusion is reflected transparently in a set of cases in which
courts have refused to entertain evidence about biological paternity and
have, instead, relied on facts about relationships and family constellations
N.Y. DOM. REL.LAw § 73 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1998). Section 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act
provides that:
under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a
[ilt
wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband
is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's
consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.LAL 301 (1987 & Supp. 1999). This rule clearly predicates paternity
on consent rather than biology. However, the rle also reflects a traditional understanding of familial
relationships. See JANET L DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TIECHOLOGY, AND REPRO.
DUCTION INAN UNEASY AGE 197 (1997).
26. Some commentators have disapproved of the use of the term "DNA fingerprinting," especially
in the context of criminal investigations, because it suggests, erroneously, that DNA-based profiles can
be used to identify people as accurately as fingerprinting. See RuTH HUBBARD & EUIAH VALD,
EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: How GENETIC INFORMAmtON IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY
SCIEmNTSTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATOR AND LAW ENFORCERS
146 (1993) (describing DNA based-identifications as "not nearly as unequivocal as fingerprints can

be").
27. See IRA MARK ELLiAN ET AL., FAMILY LAw 1055-56 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing improved
accuracy of DNA paternity tests in identifying a child's biological father).
28. See, e.g., Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726, 729-30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (refusing to
consider DNA evidence because paternity was "established by estoppel").
29. See infra Part .1B.
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to deny-or, in other cases, to recognize--the paternity of men, apparently
able and ready to offer genetic evidence that would support a contrary
holding.
For instance, in 1998, in Miscovich v. Miscovich,0 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed a lower court ruling that ended a seven-year legal
effort on the part of Gerald Miscovich to avoid paying for the support of an
eleven-year old son, born to Elizabeth Miscovich during the parties' marriage. 31 The Miscoviches were divorced in 1990.32 In 1992, Gerald subjected himself and the couple's then four-year old child to genetic testing
that excluded Gerald as the child's biological father.33 Within months,
Gerald informed his young son of the test results and completely terminated his relationship with the child.34 Elizabeth then sued a third party for
support of the young child.3 5
The trial court refused to order blood testing or to admit the DNA evidence that Gerald had obtained.36 On appeal, Gerald argued that judicial
recognition of the DNA evidence was called for, despite the state's presumption of paternity, insofar as the social ends served by the presumption
were inapplicable to his case. Specifically, Gerald noted that the presumption should not apply because he and Elizabeth had divorced, and thus no
intact family would be preserved by finding him to be his ex-wife's child's
father.37
A Pennsylvania appellate court disagreed and concluded that the presumption was applicable. 8 That court further ruled that the presumption
had not been rebutted by evidence of Gerald's sterility, impotency, or nonaccess to his wife3 9-- the traditional grounds for rebutting the presumption
of paternity. The court did, however, acknowledge a need to reexamine the
presumption of paternity given "advancements in technology."40 "We need
not," the court explained, "blindly apply [the presumption], nor cling to
timeworn principles to support the Commonwealth's goal of protecting the
family." 4 1 The court proceeded to outline a series of fact-sensitive rules

30. 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), affd, 720 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.

1757 (1999).
31. Seeid at727-28.
32. See id at 727.

33. See ide
34. See id at 728.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See ide at 732 (citing Kohler v. Bleem, 654 Ad 569, 576-77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (stating,
inter alia, that courts should consider whether the policy supporting the presumption was furthered
where the family is not intact and the mother's husband has rebutted the presumption of patemity)).

38. See ide
39. See id
40. Idat730.
41. Id.at730-31.
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531

cases.4 2

Relying on those rules, the court found
for application to paternity
a set of facts in Gerald's case that argued in favor of presuming Gerald's
paternity. The court wrote:
Here, Gerald clearly had an established relationship with his son..
. [H]e did not question it until after the relationship between him
and his wife deteriorated. Although the family is not now intact..

. a familial relationship existed at the time the child was born, and
more significantly, a parent-child bond was formed. Despite Ger-

ald's unilateral termination of this relationship and his decision to
notify the child that he was not his father, we find that a considered

application of the myriad factors involved to the facts of
3 this case
warrant a finding that the relationship still exists at law!

After the decision, Gerald continued to pay child support of over $500 a

month. He claimed that, although he was not, and did not want to be, the
child's father, he would have hoped for "'alimited nonparental role' in the

boy's life.""
Miscovich, and a number of other cases like it,4s represent the willing-

ness of courts to predicate particular familial relationships on a judge's
sense of what both the social and biological dimensions of those relationships should have been, and in doing that to contravene, or simply to ig-

nore, apparent facts about both biology and behavior. In such cases, the
law strives to sustain a traditional image of family, but in doing that, relies

on a presumption that can be conclusively disproved by accurate paternity
testing. The legal results include the proliferation of a wide variety of dis-

crete rules about paternity, each delimited for application to a particular

42. The Miscovich court, in"attempt[ing] to impose an order" on paternity decisions, first noted the
need to distinguish cases involving children born "during or out of welock." kL at 729. The court
then declared the presumption inapplicable to children born out ofwedlock. See l In such cases, the
court explained, the "determination ofpaternity... turns on the application of the estoppel principles to
the particular facts of the case." I' The establishment of paternity through estoppel principles would,
in turn, render "blood tests and evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity irrelevant." 1Iat 72930. With regard to children born during marriage, the court continued, evidence from blood tests may
not be ordered "if the presumption of paternity has not been rebutted with clear and convincing cvidence." I at 730. However, in cases in which the presumption of paternity has been rebutted, in
general, "paternity becomes a relevant fact and blood tests may be ordered" Id. That notwithstanding,
"a party's right to a blood test must be balanced against competing societal or family interests." Id
The court concluded. "Finally, the presumption is irrefitable wi-ere the mother, child and husband live
together as an intact family, with the husband assuming parental responsibility." Id
43. 1dat 733.
44. Margaret A. Jacobs, Courts FavorAncient PaternityRule over DNA Tests, WALL ST. J, June 2,
1999, atB1.
45. See, e.g., B.H. v. K.D., 506 NAV.2d 368, 374 (N.D. 1993) (denying biological father right to
assert paternity when a marital presumption exists). See also Jacobs, supra note 44, at Bl. But see
Martin v. Martin, 710 A.2d 61, 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding presumption inapplicable in case in
which "no intact family will be preserved by application of the presumption").
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sort of paternity case, and, more broadly, widespread uncertainty about
the scope of the moral order represented by those rules.
The rules for determining paternity, as outlined in Miscovich, can lead
to legal paternity being predicated on biological paternity but not on social
paternity; to legal paternity being predicated on social paternity but not
biological paternity; and sometimes to the imposition of legal paternity on
a man such as Gerald Miscovich, who bears neither a biological nor a social relation to the child for whom the law holds him responsible, as father.
The extent to which the law now defines the father-child relationship
without reference to a set of stable, over-arching rules is represented more
dramatically still by a series of four United States Supreme Court cases
decided between 1972 and 1983 concerned with the rights of unwed biological fathers to be recognized as legal fathers. The cases have generally
been interpreted to mean that putative fathers have legal rights if, and only
if, they establish significant social relationships with their children.4" That
interpretation, however, does not explain the differing outcomes in the
cases; two of which (Stanley v. Illinois48 and Caban v. Mohammed49)
granted paternal rights to an unwed putative father, and two of which
(Quilloin v. Walcott5 ° and Lehr v. Robertsonl), declined to recognize an
unwed putative father as a legal father. The Court's decisions in these
cases do not (despite the Court's claims) reflect a clear difference in the
quality of the respective fathers' social paternity.52 In each case, the Court
proclaimed that an unwed putative father becomes a legal father only
through the assertion of a social relationship with his biological child.
However, that proclamation does not account for the four decisions. The
social connection that the Court actually required in these cases was not
simply between the father and his child. Instead, the Court recognized the
legal paternity of those fathers who established "families" (marital or nonmarital) with their children and their children's mothers.53 The law deprives other putative fathers-even those bringing impressive evidence of a

46. For instance, in Miscovich, the court attempts "to impose an order on [various legal]... concepts (about paternity] in light of the various factual permutations which arise in paternity cases. The
rules," the court proclaims, "differ for each scenario." Miscovlch, 688 A2d at 729.
47. See, e.g., David L. Batty, Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The ConstitutionalRights of Putative
Fathers and a Proposalfor Reform, 31 B.C. L. REv. 1173, 1201 (1990); Elizabeth A. Hadad, Note,
Tradition and the Liberty Interest: Circumscribing the Rights of the Natural Father-MichaelH. v.
Gerald D., 56 BROoK. L. REv. 291,314,319-20 (1990).
48. 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
49. 441 U.S. 380,393-94(1979).
50. 434 U.S. 246,255-56 (1978).

51. 463 U.S. 248,267-68 (1983).
52. For a fuller analysis of the jurisprudence underlying cases involving the legal rights of unwed
fathers, see Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: JudicialAssumptions About Parenthood,40 UCLA L. REV.

637 (1993) [hereinafter Dolgin, Just a Gene].
53. See Caban,441 U.S. at 382; Stanley,405 U.S. at 646.
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genuine commitment to their children--of the right to assert legal paternity.
This reading of Stanley, Caban, Quilloin, and Lehr is reaffirmed in
light of Michael H. v. GeraldD." In Michael H., a plurality opinion upheld a California statute that precluded a biological father's rebutting the
presumption that his child was the legal child of the mother's husband.
The biological father, Michael H., was unable, as a definitional matter, to
establish a home with his child and that child's mother because the mother
was married to another man at the time of the child's conception and birth,
and remained married to that man at the time of the litigation!" The explicit message of Michael H.--that a putative father's legal rights to paternity depend on his establishing a home with his child and that child's
mother-was implicit in the earlier cases s
In short, the unwed father cases (including Stanley, Caban, Quilloin,
Lehr, and Michael H.) suggest an essential confusion underlying the law's
understanding of paternity. In these cases, taken as a group, the Court relied expressly on a rule for determining the legal paternity of putative fathers--that a putative father will enjoy paternal rights if, and only if, he
effects a social relationship with his child5 9 But the rule fails to explain
the particular decisions rendered by the Court. A somewhat different
rule-one left unarticulated by the Court--comes closer to explaining the
decisions. But that second rule-a rule grounded in traditional assumptions about the relationship of a man to the mother of his children-serves
which traditional families are almost as often the
poorly a generation in
60
rule.
the
as
exception
54. In Lehr, the Court rejected the petition of Jonathan Lehr to prevent the adoption of his biologi-

cal daughter by the child's mother's husband. The majority decision ignored the history of the parties
detailed in Justice White's dissent. Justice White explained that Lehr had not enjoyed a full social
relationship with his daughter, Jessicn, only because he had been definitively precluded from such a
relationship by the child's mother. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J,dissenting). In fact, Jessica's
mother had hidden the child from Lehr who "never ceased his efforts to locate" his daughter. Ia After
Lehr succeeded in locating Jessica, the child's mother threatened Lhr with arrest if he attempted to see
the child. See id.
55. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
56. See id.at 128-30.
57. See id. at 113-16.

58. See Dolgin, Just a Gene, szqra note 52, at 650-72 (analyzing A.ichael H.and earlier Supreme
Court decisions involving unwed fathers).
59. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
60. A cartoon by Litzler, printed in the New Yorker in late 1998, features two women in lab coats,

holding clipboards, presumably social scientists or statisticians, proclaiming: "Well, it finally happened, statistically spealdng. The traditional family is no longer normal." Mark Litzlrr, Cartoon,
WALL ST. 3., June 18, 1999, at 19.
Between 1940 and 1993, the rate of children born to unmarried parents increased from 5 percent
to 31 percent. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATUn AND THE
RECONSTUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER 42 (1999) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTCAL
79
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES, Table 98, p.
Office, 1996)). Fukuyama notes as well that between 1994 and 1997, the ratio of children born to
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Thus, recent cases about paternity-both the unwed father cases and
cases such as Miscovich involving married men disclaiming the paternity
of their wives' children-illustrate the law's striving to preserve a traditional view of family, while simultaneously constructing a series of new,
but not altogether consistent rules that reflect various dimensions of actual
contemporary families. Consequently, the continued invocation of the
presumption that a man is the biological father of his wife's child serves
little beyond rhetorical ends. Moreover, the fictive quality of the presumption in cases in which DNA evidence belies the presumption's biological
reality disconfirms a moral order in which the biological dimensions of
kinship were expected to serve (because it was assumed that they reflected-or at least should reflect) social ends. Still, however, these cases
cling to the presumption-though now openly as illusion-thatthe identification and regulation of familial relationships can be anchored in presumptions about underlying biological facts.
Thus, in determining paternity, the law remains committed, at least in
theory, to a traditional moral order. That courts often reach holdings that
discard, or conflict with, the essential assumptions underlying that order is
not taken to diminish the law's express commitment to preserving the domestic arena as one characterized by affective (and, even more felicitously,
enduring) bonds of commitment and love. Most important Miscovich and
the other cases about paternity, represent the continuing force of nostalgia
for tradition.6 1
B. DefiningMother: Biology in the Service of intention
The presumption that a man is the father of his wife's children has depended implicitly on the certainty of biological maternity. Inevitably, until
the last decades of the twentieth century, a woman who gestated and gave
birth to a child was also that child's genetic mother. With the advent of
reproductive technology, the possibility of separating maternity into aspects has challenged deeply held social assumptions about biological maternity and about the mother-child bond.
In a number of cases involving gestational surrogates, 62 courts have
unmarried mothers leveled off. See id. at 43 (citing U.S DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 47, No. 4, p. 15 (Washington, D.C.:

USHHS, October 7, 1998))
61.

See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WENEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE

NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992).
62. The term "gestational surrogate" refers to a woman who gestates and gives birth to a baby to

whom she has no genetic connection. Indicatively, in cases in which the gestator is also the intending
mother, (the woman who, from the start, plans to socialize the resulting child), she is referred to as a
"gestational mother" and the "genetic mother" is referred to as an "egg donor." See, e.g., Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (Cal. 1993) (labeling the case in which "a woman gestates and gives
birth to a child formed from the egg of another woman with the intent to raise the child as her own" as
"a true 'egg donation' situation").
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had to consider the comparative significance of various biological and social components of maternity. The results suggest a startling readiness to
displace completely the biogenetic component of family bonds as courts
expressly privilege parental intention over biological connections in determining maternity.
The first such case, Johnson v. Calvert,3 decided in California in 1993,
involved a dispute about the parentage of a child conceived from the egg of
one woman but gestated and born to a second woman. The case arose out
of a dispute among Anna Johnson, Mark Calvert, and Crispina Calvert.
The Calverts, a married couple, unable to have children without medical
assistance because Crispina's uterus had been surgically removed, entered
into a contract with Anna Johnson.65 Under the contract, Anna agreed to
gestate and give birth to a child conceived from Mark's sperm and
Crispina's egg, and at the child's birth to surrender all maternal rights to
the Calverts.' The contract provided further that the Calverts would pay
Anna Johnson $10,000 in a series of installments.' Johnson became pregnant soon after the agreement was signed. In the sixth month of her pregnancy, she wrote to the Calverts informing them that she would refuse to
surrender maternal rights if they did not immediately pay the entire balance
due.68 As a result, in September 1990, several months before the birth of
the baby (Christopher), his genetic parents and his gestational mother were
in court disputing his parentage.
Before Johnson, a court had never been asked to determine a child's
"natural" mother in a case in which the biological facts were certain.
Moreover, a court had never before been asked to decide the maternity of a
child with two biological mothers.6 9
A number of conceptual options were open to the courts. Arguably, as
the trial court in fact concluded, the child's genetic mother was its "real,"
63. No. X-633190, slip op. (Cal. App. Dep't Super. CL Oct. 22, 1990), affd sub nom. Anna J. v.
Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), arFdsub nom. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776
(Cal. 1993), cert.deniedsub nom. Baby Boy 1. v. Johnson, 510 U.S. 938 (1993).
64. See generallyJanet L. Dolgin, An EmergingConsensus:Reproducth'e Technolog andthe Law,

23 VT.LAW. REv. 225 (1998) [hereinafter Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus] (analyzing Johnson, as
well as several related California cases, in greater detail).
65. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.

66. See id
67. See id
68. See id
69. Both the Calverts' and Johnson's briefs to the court respectively stressed each woman's bio-

logical preeminence. For instance, the Calverts urged the state's intermediate appellate court to recognize the significance of "human blood lines." Brief for Respondents at 49, Anna J.v. Mark C., 286
Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. CL App. 1991) (No. X-633190). Anna Johnson, in turn, defined herself as the
baby's biological mother and referred to the "mixing of blood between [pregnant] mother and baby."
Appellant's Reply Brief at 8, Anna J.v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (No.

S023721) [hereinafter Johnson Reply Brief to Court of Appeal]. Similarly, Dr. David Chamberlain,
who testified for Johnson at trial, described Johnson and the baby as "intimately attached and blochemically related." Id at 6-7 (citing transcript R.T. Vol. III
p. 621).
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mother. 70

and thus, its legal
The courts could have defined the birth mother
as the "real" mother. State statutory law, however, gave some support to
each possibility.7 Or, perhaps, as an amicus brief by the American Civil
Liberties Union argued, both mothers were "real," and thus legal mothers.72
All three state courts that heard the case identified the Calverts as baby
Christopher's parents. Not surprisingly, in a dispute raising novel questions and presenting unprecedented facts, each court grounded its holding
in a different reading of the facts and of the law. The trial court relied on a
reading of the biological facts that privileged genetics over gestation in
defining maternity. 73 The intermediate appellate court affirmed the lower
court's ruling, but relied on a reading of California statutory law.74 Finally,
the state supreme court affirmed the rulings of the two lower courts, but on
entirely different grounds. Concluding that neither the biological facts nor
existing statutory law offered clear guidance, the court relied on parental
intentions to establish parentage. The court wrote:
[A]lthough the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and
giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who
intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring
about the birth of a child that she intended
to raise as her own-is
75
the naturalmother under California law.
In that conclusion, the court expressly displaced biology with intention as
the essential ground of "natural" maternity. Intent suggests choice and
negotiation, and thus appears to assimilate a determination about maternity
to the rules of the marketplace. Nothing could have been further from the
court's express design. The court described Crispina Calvert's intentional
maternity as effecting an enduring, loving relation between herself and
baby Christopher, a relation as certain and powerful as any predicated on a
biological bond.76 Mimicking the legal presumption that a child's best
interests are served by granting custody to a biological parent, the court
determined Crispina Calvert to be the better mother. "[T]he interests of
children, particularly at the outset of their lives," the court declared, "'are
70. See Johnson, No. X-633190, slip op. at 4-5 (concluding that Crispina Calvert was the child's
"genetic, biological and natural mother").
71. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 780. The intermediate appellate court relied on statutory law to Identify Crispina Calvert as Christopher's legal mother. In fact, however, as the state supreme court explained, statutory law (written at a time before it was possible to separate biological maternity Into
aspects) could be read as establishing both the genetic mother and the birth mother as legal mothers.
See id.
72. See idat781 n.8.
73. See Johnson, No.X-633190, slip
op.at 5.

74. See Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr.at 373-78.
75. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (emphasis added).

76. See id
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[un]likely
to run contrary to those of adults who choose to bring them into
77
being."'
Finally, the court was explicit that its reliance on intention should not
be read to suggest a preference for the genetic, over the gestational, aspects
of maternity in defining legal maternity. The court's reliance on parental
intent was not a pretext for formulating a rule that would, in fact, find a
child's genetic parents to be that child's "natural" (real) parents. The court
explained: "under our analysis, in a true 'egg donation' situation, where a
woman gestates and gives birth to a child formed from the egg of another
woman with the intent to raise the child
as her own, the birth mother is the
78
natural mother under California law."
The next year, just such a case arose in New York. In response, a New
York court relied on the model established in Johnson. The New York
case, McDonaldv. McDonald,9 involved questions about the parentage of
twin girls, conceived from the ova of one woman but gestated by another
woman. Commenced as a divorce action, the case developed out of a dispute between Robert McDonald, the biological father of the girls, and Olga
Benitez McDonald, the gestational mother."0 The facts in McDonald present a mirror image of those in Johnson in that Olga, the intending motherthe woman who from the start intended to be a social mother-gestated and
gave birth to the children but conceived them through the use of donated
ova." At trial, Robert urged the court to grant him custody because,
among other things, he was the "sole genetic parent among the parties. ' 82
The court rejected Robert's argument and proceeded to recognize Olga as
the natural mother because she was the intending mother. 3 The court asserted:
In the case at bar, we have a true 'egg donation' situation, and we
find the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California on this issue
to be persuasive. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, Queens
County, correctly held that in the instant 'egg donation' case, the
wife, who is the gestational mother, is the natural mother of the
children, and is, under the circumstances, entitled to temporary
custody of the children with visitation to the husband!4

77. Id at 783 (quoting Madjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology andIntent.Based Parenthood An OpportunilyforGenderNeutraliy, 1990 Wis. L.REV. 297,397).

78. I/ at782n.10.
79. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
80. See id at 478.
81. See kLat480.
82. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 18-19, McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App.

Div. 1994) (No. 91-08907) [hereinafter McDonald Appellant Bricaf.
83. See McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
84. Id. (citation and footnote omitted). Arguably, the denomination of Crispina Calvert as Christo-

pher's "natural" mother followed from parts of California statutory law that regulate the identification
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Neither the decision in Johnson nor that in McDonald represents a
broad judicial willingness routinely to privilege intention over biology in
determining parentage. Rather, in each case, the court invoked the intentions of the disputing parties after concluding that it was impossible to
reach a determination about parentage through reference to biology. For
each court, both sides made cognizable claims to biological parentage.
Thus, both Johnson and McDonald suggest that courts should look to intentional parentage to resolve an apparent biological "tie" but not to grant
parentage to someone lacking any biological connection to the child involved.
That limitation on the reach of intentional parentage was abandoned in
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 5 a 1998 California case. Buzzanca, like
McDonald, involved a divorce between the intending parents of a child
conceived in vitro and gestated by a woman not related genetically to the
child she carried and bore. 6 However, unlike the parents in McDonald,
neither John nor Luanne Buzzanca, the intending parents in Buzzanca, was
related biologically to the child, a girl named Jaycee, born in 1995.87 The
Buzzancas had entered into a contract with a gestational surrogate, Pamela
Snell. Snell agreed to gestate and give birth to a child for Luanne and
John. 8 The Buzzancas arranged for Snell to become pregnant through use
of an embryo created from the sperm and ovum of anonymous donors.8 9
Buzzanca differed from the majority of cases occasioned by reproductive technology in that custody of the child was sought by too few, rather
than by too many, potential parents. John, who separated from Luanne
before Jaycee's birth and who was anxious to avoid a support obligation
for Jaycee, claimed that he was not a legal party to the surrogacy agreement because he had not signed the surrogacy contract until after conception of the baby. 90 The gestational surrogate, Pamela Snell, filed for custody during the proceedings between the Buzzancas, but later withdrew her
claim. 91 The trial court, faced with at least six potential parents-John,
of a child's "natural" parent. In New York, however, no such statutory provision compelled the
McDonald court to define Olga McDonald as the twins' "natural" mother. See Id. at 479-80.
85. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). For a more complete description and analysis of
Buzzanca, see Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus, supra note 64, at 243-53.
86. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.

87. See id.
88. See Donna Foote, Family: And Baby Makes One: In a Bizarre Clash of the Law and Fertility

Techniques, Jaycee is a Child Without aParent, NEWSwEEK, Feb. 2, 1998, at 70.
89. See id John Buzzanca had been diagnosed with a low sperm count, and Luanne Buzzanca
suffered from endometriosis. The couple had not succeeded in becoming pregnant through use of
artificial insemination and in-vitro fertilization. See id. at 68.
90. See Jaycee B. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 696-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (declaring
trial court had jurisdiction to compel John to contribute child support for Jaycee pending decision on
question of parentage).
91. See Davan Maharaj, Case May Redefine Fatherhood in State, L.A. lIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, at
BI, available in LEXIS, News Library,. Lat File.
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Luanne, Pamela and her husband, the sperm donor and the egg donor92only one of whom (Luanne) sought parentage or custody--concluded that
Baby Jaycee was a child without parentage.
On appeal, a state appellate court reversed, concluding that the Buz-

zancas' parental status was established at Jaycee's birth by reason of their
parental intentions. 94 The decision dramatically expands the importance of

intentional parenthood as delineated in Johnson (on which the Buzzanca
court ostensibly relied).9s In Johnson, the court depended on parental in-

tentions to define parentage in a case in which the intending parents and
the surrogate with whom they were in dispute, all bore a biological relation

to the child.

The Buzzanca court, in contrast, applied the Johnson intent-

standard to define as parents-indeed as "natural parents"--two people
who had no biological connection to the child involved.97

Buzzanca clearly postulates a form of parentage ab initio that does not
depend on bonds grounded in biology. Unlike adoptive parentage, which

depends on the termination of the rights of a biological parent (or parents),
the sort of parentage delineated in Buzzanca assumes no previous parent.

That difference is reflected in the Johnson and Buzzanca courts' use of the
term "natural" parent to refer to parties whose parentage was grounded,
from the start, on the intention to be a social parent.9 8
As a group, the gestational surrogacy/gestational motherhood" cases

(Johnson, McDonald, and Buzzanca) suggest a new stress in social and
moral definitions of parentage. 0 0 Each court substituted parental "inten92. Arguably, the spouses of the sperm and egg donors could also have hA cognizable claims to
the parentage of Jaycee. Although the Buzzaneas apparently believed the egg and sperm donors Aere
unidentifiable, they may well have been identified. See 48 Hours: The Famly Tree; Child Born to Invitro FertilizationMay Have Been Createdfrom Stolen Embrjo (CBS television broadcast, May 14,
1998), available in LEXIS, News Library, CBSnews File. Jaycee was conceived at a California infertility clinic associated with University of California-Irvine. That clinic was closed in 1995 after it was
revealed that patients were receiving gametes retrieved from other clinic patients who had not consented to such donations. See id In 1998, Jaycee's genetic parents were identified by a lawyer attempting to trace the "stolen" gametes. See itt Both the person identified as Jaycee's genetic mother
and the person identified as her genetic fther are married to other people. See iU
93. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283. Trial court Judge Robert Monarch declared:
So I think what evidence there is, is stipulated to. And I don't think there would be any
more. One, there's no genetic tie between Luanne and the child. Two, she is not the gestational mother. Three, she has not adopted the child. That, folks, to me, respectfully, is clear
and convincing evidence that she's not the legal mother.
It
94. See ia at 288-89.
95. See id at 288.
96. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
97. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal.
1993)).
98. See id at 285-86.
99. See supra note 62 (considering different uses of the terms "gestational surrogate" and "gestational mother").
100. See infra Part II.C (expressly considering moral implications of these cases).
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tions" for biology in anchoring parentage. The substitution is surprising in
that intention is the correlate of choice and, as such, would seem ill-fitted
to safeguard traditional understandings of parentage, grounded on a conception of inexorable truthsWI1 Yet, that was the express aim of these
courts. In effect, the courts presumed that the forms through which families are created need not implicate their operation. Each court elided (as in
Johnson and McDonald) or expressly disregarded (as in Buzzanca) biological facts in order to safeguard other aspects of a traditional understanding of parentage. In doing that, each court described parental intentions as providing a firm foundation-quite as firm as that provided by
biology-for the actualization of loving, enduring parent-child relationships.' 0 2
The recognition of intention, and thus choice, as central to the construction of family relationships is not limited to cases occasioned by reproductive technology. The law has focused on the autonomy of individual
family members in determining the rights and duties of adult family members vis-a-vis one another. Beginning in 1969, legislatures began widely to
provide for no-fault divorce.
At about the same time, courts began to
recognize
and enforce antenuptial agreements and cohabitation agree14
ments. '
These changes represent a clear shift away from a family law system
committed to a vision of families as holistic, hierarchically structured social units with identities encompassing and superseding the identities of
individual members. Only rarely have courts been anxious to re-envision
the parent-child bond in similar terms, but that has begun to occur in the
context of disputes occasioned by reproductive technology. °5 The rapid
development of that technology, and the confusion it has engendered about
the implications of biological parentage, have compelled, or at least encouraged, courts to seek alternative visions of the parent-child relationship
as well as of relationships among adults within families. Johnson,
McDonald, and Buzzanca, among other cases, expressly represent judicial
readiness to premise even the parent-child relationship on bargained

101. See Janet L. Dolgin, The "Intent" of Reproduction:Reproductive Technologies and the Parent.
Child Bond, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1261, 1308-12 (1994) (suggesting fragility of attempt to safeguard

traditional families through reliance on conceptual instrument of intention).
102. See infra Part II.C.
103. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE 45-

46 (1999) (considering shift to no-fault divorce rules).
104. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970); Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d

662, 666-67 (Ga. 1982); Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 815-16 (Mass. 1981); see also Doris J.
Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 22 FAM. L.Q. 367, 511,

515-16 (1988) (noting that in enforcing cohabitation agreements and antenuptial agreements, courts
rely heavily on standard principles of contract law).
105. See infra note 106 (referring to cases involving children "divorcing" their parents).
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10 6

choices.
C.

"Families-of-Choice"

In cases involving disputes about biological and legal paternity as well
as in those involving disputes about gestational and genetic maternity,

courts have justified their holdings as being most likely to protect families
as moral units, characterized by diffuse enduring solidarity. Moreover,
each court disentangled the biological and social dimensions of familial
relationships precisely to safeguard families as moral units-as units of
enduring love and solidary commitment. However, in their willingness to

overlook or displace the biological "facts of family," these courts have
dismantled the frame within which
the traditional families they presume to
07
preserve were once delimited.1

In short, the gestational surrogacy/gestational motherhood cases differ
from the cases involving paternity in abandoning the presumption that
families are grounded on biological truths. However, Miscovich, Johnson,

McDonald,and Buzzanca all testify to the power of nostalgia for tradition
in family matters. Each of these courts set out to safeguard the moral di-

mensions of family life. Each court associated that notion with traditional
family life. But the Miscovich court located tradition in the social force of
the marital tie," 8 while the Johnson, McDonald, and Buzzanca courts lo-

cated tradition by recognizing maternal intentionality as a substitute for
biological maternity."°

The Miscovich court presumed a biological con-

nection between a man and his wife's child in order to preserve a traditional family unit, and in doing that, ignored the biological facts presented
by Gerald Miscovitch."' In contrast, courts in cases occasioned by gesta106. A number of cases outside the context of reproductive technology show a similar shift in the
law's approach to parent-child relationships. For instance, a few courts have been willing to premise
custody (though rarely parentage) on considerations that ignore, or that conflict with the implications of
relevant biological facts. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 284-85 (N.Y. 1976) (granting
custody to non-parent despite presence of fit parent, due to "extraordinary circumstance]" of nonparent having cared for child for long period); Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 154, 158 (Iowa)
(granting custody to maternal grandparents despite readiness of "fit" widowed father to raise child),
cerL denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966). Moreover, in a few more recent cases, state courts have granted
young children standing to question their own parentage. Se, e.g., Gregory K. v. Ralph K., No. C1925127, 1992 WL 551488 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 20, 1992), rev'dsub non Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d
780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Though overturned on appeal, the Florida trial court granted eleven
year-old Gregory standing to contest his biological mother's parentage. See Ia at 01. In a second
Florida case, a trial court granted standing to a child to challenge a prior court stipulation about her
parentage. See Twigg v. May, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WVL 330624, at *3 (Fla Cir. CL Aug. 18,
1993).
107. For an anthropologist's analysis of the concept of "families-of-cholce," see KAnH WESTON.
FAmIIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP (1991).
108. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
109. See supranotes 100-02 and accompanying text.
110. See Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A2d 726, 730-33 (Pa. Super. C. 1997), aft'd,720 A.2d 764
(Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1757 (1999).

CONNECTICUT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 32:523

tional surrogacy (Johnson, McDonald, and Buzzanca) were unable to ignore the reproductive facts.' Each dispute was defined by the novelty of
those facts. Moreover, in each case, discerning the implications of those
facts constituted the central judicial task. These courts did, however, elide
the biological facts. The courts in each gestational surrogacy case selfconsciously substituted knowledge ("intent") about biological facts for
those facts in defining maternity." 2 Then, each court presumed that the
creation of family units need not implicate their operation.
In the families that Schneider portrayed in the 1960s," 3 the biological
and social dimensions of kinship were inextricably connected. Each dimension implicated, and depended upon, the other. Biological bonds were
understood to ground social bonds in inexorable natural, and thus, in moral,
truth. Schneider wrote:
The biological elements in the definition of kinship have the quality of symbols. That blood relatives share biogenetic substance is a
symbol of unity, of oneness, and this is symbolically interchangeable with the symbol of love.... [Bliological unity is the symbol
for all other kinds of unity including, most4 importantly, that of relationships of enduring diffuse solidarity.'"
In confronting the challenges that DNA fingerprinting presents to assumptions about paternity and that gestational surrogacy presents to assumptions about maternity, the law reflects and fosters an ideology of family that prizes autonomous individuality. The law, like the larger society,
views the domestic arena in terms once reserved for life in the marketplace.
Biology becomes less important as contract and its correlates (choice, intention, and promise) become more important. But at the same time, the
law masks that process by continuing to rely on the terms, though not the
broad design, of traditional family life.
III. GENETIC IDEOLOGIES: TESTING THE LIMITS OF CHOICE
A new variant-more accurately, a new conception-of family"

5

111. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781-82 (Cal. 1993); McDonald v. McDonald, 608
N.Y.S.2d 477, 479-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286, 288-89 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998).

112. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; McDonald,608 N.Y.S.2d at 480; Buzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
286,288-89.

113. Schneider described the culture of American families and not their demography. Thus, he was
concerned with the symbols that defined families and with the family as a symbol. He did not suggest
that actual families necessarily conformed to that model. See SCHNEIDER, supranote 5, at 1-6.
114. Id at 52-53. Schneider defined "enduring diffuse solidarity" as sociological jargon for what
Americans most usually referred to as "love." l at 50.

115. The reification implicit in the notion of a "genetic family" as a variant of family should not be
read to suggest that the "genetic family" can be described demographically (as can, for Instance, the socalled "family-of-choice").
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poses an unfamiliar challenge to existing conceptions of family-to fami-

lies understood as holistic, solidary communities, as well as to families
understood as collections of autonomous individuals, free to choose their
own relationships through bargained negotiation. This new perception of
family, referred to in this article as the "genetic family," is being elaborated

largely in medical contexts through the notion of genetic diseases. In understandings of the genetic (or medicalized)" 6 family, biology can be neither ignored nor displaced. It alone determines the scope of the familial

unit.
A. The Ideology of the Genetic Family
As an ideological construct, the genetic family reflects the older
eugenics movements of the first half of the twentieth century,1 7 as well as
a more widespread view of biology as destiny. However, the elaboration
of the ideology of genetic inheritance and of its institutional counterpart,
the human genome project,' 18 are transforming the construct of the genetic
family into a social unit subject, as such, to genetic testing, diagnosis, and
discrimination. In consequence, the genetic family develops a reality of its
own. Its development further fragments the ideology within which families are understood, and challenges the presumption that society can safeguard traditional families or modem families-so-called families-ofchoice-as units of love grounded in loyalty and solidary commitment.
The biological dimensions of the traditional family that Schneider described operated within, and informed, a larger moral frame." 9 Even as
courts have ignored or elided the biological dimension of family in recent
decades, they have struggled to preserve the sense of a moral order associated with the traditional family and grounded in biogenetic substance. That
concern has directed courts as they have assessed both the significance of
DNA fingerprinting in paternity cases and the comparative importance of
genetics and gestation in surrogacy cases.' That concern-preserving the
social dimensions of traditional family relationships-is threatened by the
116. See FNKLER, supranote13, at 14.
117. The start of the so-called "modem" eugenics movement is associated with Francis Galton, wtho
suggested that the human species could be improved through application of methods applied to the
breeding of plants and animals. Galton's theories gained widespread popularity in the United States,
Britain, and Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. See Daniel . Kevies, Out ofEugenlcs:
The HistoricalPoliticsofthe Human Genome, in THE CODE OF CODES: SCIEnFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES
INTHE HUMAN GENOm PRoJEcT 3, 4-11 (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992) (describing
history ofeugenics movements).
118. The Human Genome Project (HGP) is the joint effort ofsixteen nations to discover and map all
human genes. See BARRY R. FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERiALS AND PROBLEMS
1001-02 (3d ed. 1997). The HGP is funded in the United States by the Department of Energy and the
National Institutes of Health. See id at 1001.
119. see ScHNEmIER, supra notes 5-6, 12 and accompanying text (portraying ethnography of American kinship at mid-twentieth century).
120. See supraPart IIA-B.
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genetic family. The genetic family is defined through tests and diagnoses,
developed as part of the new genetics. 2 1 The moral frame, within which
traditional family life was understood, disappears-to be replaced with the
construct of the gene. Genetic information alone becomes relevant. Genes
suggest nothing about social relationships. They are simply data. As such,
they neither represent nor demand particular moral links among the people
they describe. The notion of the gene as the arbiter of personhood could
replace culture, morality, religion, and history-indeed time itself-with
mapped sequences of DNA.12
Recognizing human nature as "fixed by our genes" abdicates responsibility in favor of a predetermined biological self.'2 Thus, ultimately, the
force of amoral genetic data will likely deflect even the illusion that choice
provides salvation.1 24 Moreover, the ideology of genetic inheritance challenges the lingering presumption that family relationships, even if predicated on choice, differ in some essential regard from relationships in the
marketplace. Genetic families exist neither in the marketplace nor in the
home. They inhabit the interstices between home and work. As the ideology of genetic inheritance and the construct of a genetic family become
increasingly relevant in non-domestic settings (medicine, employment,
insurance), the family enters the marketplace in a new guise.
A peculiar irony follows. Just as family law disavows the traditional
presumption that the social correlates of family life flow from inexorable
biological truths, biological understandings of personhood and of family
gain increased significance in the marketplace. In the world of work, the
temptation to make decisions about individuals and about their genetic
family members solely on the basis of biological data can become compelling.
Moreover, the construct of a genetic family portends a new conception
of personhood that could, at least in theory, substitute for both the person
in traditional families of hierarchically arranged statuses and for the
autonomous individual who populates families-of-choice. Genetic information can be used to describe individuals and groups. However, the
groups so described are understood according to the metaphor of the individual.
The notion of one human genome-a notion suggested in the appella121. The Human Genome Project is expected to allow scientists to identify genes responsible for
thousands of diseases. Screening tests already exist for genes associated with many diseases including
breast cancer, Huntington's Disease, and Goucher's Disease. See JEREMy RIFKIN, THE BiOTECH
CENTURY: HARNESSING THE GENE AND REMAKING THE WORLD 26-27 (1998).

122. Ruth Hubbard and Elijah Wald describe the human genome project as "reductionism at its most
extreme." HUBBARD & WALD, supranote 26, at 3.
123. R-C. LEwONTrN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES: BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY AND HUMAN NATURE 6

(1984).
124. In fostering a-responsibility, the new genetics may briefly facilitate the yearnings of a society
already convinced that moral anchors impede the proliferation of choice.
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tion, Human Genome Project-is a statistical construct that represents no
one's actual genome. Statistical license allows the human genome to stand
for "human nature," and thus for any person's genome although, in fact,
5
the actual genomes of particular people differ by millions of bases.1 Inherent to the Human Genome Project is a concept of a "normal" genome,
the so-called "human genome. ' 126 The level of social value attached to
genetic information thus depends on context. Sub-groups and individuals
can be defined as deviant insofar as maps of their genomes vary from that
of the "human" genome map.
As a result, knowledge about a group's genome map can implicate
individuals, assumed on other grounds to belong to the group. Equally,
genetic information about an individual can implicate familial, racial, ethnic, and national groups to which that person belongs. The potential for
invidious discrimination is clear. Anecdotal accounts already exist, describing discrimination against groups on the basis of genetic information
about an individual. 27 One mother reported that her family's health insurer canceled the family's coverage after a doctor described her six-year
old son on an insurance claim form as suffering from fragile X syndrome, a
hereditary condition that involves mental retardation, even though none of
the child's siblings had been diagnosed with fragile X.12
Equally, knowledge of a group's genome map can implicate group
members. Professors Dreyfuss and Nelkin note that "[i]f it is accepted that
genetic endowment determines the propensity to commit bad acts, then
hereditary traits, which often reduce to ethnic group membership, may one
day be considered evidence of the commission of a crime."'' 9 The possimore genetic conditions
bility becomes increasingly serious as more and
30
are associated with ethnic and national groups.
The ideological implications are astonishing. The notion of the genetic
family encourages shifts in the locus of social value from the autonomous
125. See Evelyn Fox Keller, Nature, Nurture and the Human Genome Project, In THE CODE OF
CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENwoiME PROJECT 281, 294 (Daniel J. Kelves

& Leroy Hood eds, 1992).
126. See id at 298-99 (considering notion of"normal").
127. See Geoffrey Cowley, Funk the Gene Test and Lose Your Insurance, NEWSwEEK, Dec. 23,
1996, at 48 (noting "recent" study by Virginia Lapham of Georgetown University reporting 22% of
respondents in genetic disease support groups had experienced insurance discrimination rnd 13%
experienced employment discrimination; and noting 1996 study by Lisa Geller of Harvard Medical
School reporting 200 cases of genetic discrimination against healthy people).
128. See id
129. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudenceof Ger-tIcs, 45 VAND. L
REV. 313, 331 (1992).

130. Sickle-cell anemia is associated with people of African American desccnt thalassemia with
people of Southeast Asian, Greek, Italian and Ashkenazi Jewish descent idiopathic torsion dystonia,
Gaucher Disease, and BRCAI, abreast cancer gene, with people ofJeikish descent. See Stephen Aaron
Silver, Note, Beyond Jaffee v. Redmond. Should the Federal Courts Recognize a Right to Phk'lclanPatientConfidentiality?,58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1809, 1860 n.233 (1998).
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individual to that of larger wholes. Thus, the new genetics and the genetic
family-or the genetic race and the genetic ethnic group-provide for the
collapse of autonomous individuality, and its replacement by larger
wholes, each envisioned according to the metaphor of the autonomous individual. As a result, the autonomous individual can be rendered irrelevant.
In defining "genetic information," a few state legislatures have recognized that an individual's genome can be used to implicate family members.'
The Ninth Circuit also recognized this possibility in NormanBloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories.32 In that case, the circuit
court found that pre-employment testing of African American applicants
for the sickle-cell
trait constituted a violation of Title VII of the Civil
33
Rights Act.
Generally, however, lawmakers have assumed the autonomous individual as the subject of protective legislation concerning genetic information. In consequence, they have not widely focused on the implications of
genetic information for familial, and larger groups. In a few judicial cases,
however, those implications become manifest.
B. Legal Responses to the New Genetics: Autonomy and the Genetic
Family
Francis S. Collins, Director of the Human Genome Research Institute,
has pressed lawmakers to calm popular fears about the implications and
consequences of the human genome project. Those fears, Collins explained, interfere with ongoing research.134 Collins has also acknowledged
the specific threat posed to privacy within family contexts by the discovery
and communication of genetic information. Commenting to the press in
early 1999, Dr. Collins made the concern explicit. "Would I want to
know," he asked, "my future spouse's DNA?' t 35 In answering his own
131. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-2()) (Michie Supp. 1999) (defining "genetic Information"
as "information about the genetic makeup of a person or members of a person's family"); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 659.700(5) (LEXIS Supp. 1998) (defining "genetic information" as "information about
an individual or family"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-10(2) (West Supp. 1998) (defining "genetic information" as "information about genes, gene products, or genetic characteristics derived from an individual or a family member of the individual"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2704(a) (LEXIS Supp. 1998)

(precluding insurance provider from requesting or requiring disclosure of "genetic information about
the individual or family member of the individual").
132. 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998).

133. See idat 1271-72.
134. See Monique K. Mansoura & Francis S. Collins, Medical Implications of the Genetic Revolution, I J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 329, 344 (1998) (citing Francis S.Collins, Statement Before the

Congressional Task Force on Health Records and Genetic Privacy, Preventing Genetic Discrimination
in Health Insurance (July 22, 1997), <http//.nhgri.nh.gov/Policyand__publleaffairs/Legislation/steamsh.html>).
135. Ronald Kutulak, Genetics ReshapingMedicine: The Future is Nowfor the Powerful New Tool,
CHIC. TRIB., Feb. 21, 1999, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File.
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query, Collins sided with privacy and acknowledged a view of spouses as
autonomous individuals in relation to each other. "Only," he responded,
"if my spouse was willing to tell me.... Would I want love to reign supreme? You bet. The autonomy of the individual, even in marriage, ought
to be preserved."' 36
The law has widely shared Collins' concern with protecting privacy.
For the most part, lawmakers have refrained-at least outside the context
of the abortion debate' 3 -- from directly limiting the development of genetic research138 or its practical applications.13 9 Accordingly, most at-

tempts to draft protective legislation have concentrated on safeguarding
privacy from a threat perceived as implicit in the discovery and proliferation of genetic information, and on precluding potentially discriminatory

uses of that information. 40 State legislatures have, for instance, begun to
136. Id
137. Congress has prohibited the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Health and Human
Services for research that involves embryonic destruction for non-therapeutic purposes. See 110 Stat.
3009-243 (1996).
138. In this regard, legislative responses reflect what Larry Gostin describes as "the current mood in
academic bioethics." Laurie Garrett, Long Island Our Future/Chapter 2: Health and AMdlcine/Tomorrow's Cures/Healingfirom the Inside/SclentistsForecasta Revolution in Medical Care as
Surgery Gives Way to ManipulatingDNA andRestoring Damaged Cells, NEWSDAY, Feb. 7, 1999, at
H03, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newsdy File. That mood frowns on curtailing research as a
limitation on personal freedom.
139. Legal responses to the 1997 announcement that Ian Wilmut had cloned a sheep are indicative.
Even following the widely heralded recommendation of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
to ban human cloning for a period of years, see CLONING HtmiAN BEINGS: REPORT AND RECO.%tMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COmMISSION (1997) [herinafler NBAC
REPORT], Congress passed no legislation.

The technology that allows cloning is a product of research in molecular biology. Immediately,
President Clinton directed the National Bioethics Advisory Commission to review the legal and social
implications of cloning and to prepare a report. See Judy Mann, The Brave New Jyorld of Cloning,
WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1997, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, WVpost File. The NBAC Report
was published in June 1997. Although Congress did not effect the Report's recommendations, many
bills were proposed in the few years following the realization of animal cloning. See, ag., Emily Ramsey, Legal Responses to the Potential Cloning of Human Beings, 32 VAL U. L REv. 433, 436-41
(1998) (describing bills about cloning introduced in House or Senate). Similarly, state legislatures
considered many bills about cloning but few enacted laws. Both Califomin and Rhode Island banned
human cloning for five years. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2260.5 (West 1998); RI. GEN. LAWS §
23-16.4-1 (1998). See also MICH. CONP. LAWS § 333.20197 (1998) (NlcT. STAT. ANN. § 14.15
(20197) (1998)) (prohibiting attempts to clone humans but allowing a registrant to engage in scientific
research or cell-based therapies).
Some commentators have claimed that proposed and existing statutory rules do interfere with
research, but that has rarely been the express goal of those sponsoring such bills. One representative of
the biotechnology industry is quoted to have said: "Some of the legislaon [aimed at limiting the dissemination of genetic information] would virtually stop genetic research or severely limit our ability to
conduct clinical trials." Meredith A. Jagutis, Insurer'sAccess to Genetic Information: The Callfor
Comprehensive Federal Legislation, 82 MARQ. L REV. 429, 430 (1999) (citing Robert Pear, States
Pass Laws to Regulate Use of Genetic Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1997, at Al (quoting Carl B.
Feldbaum, president ofthe Biotechnology Industry Organization)).
140. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (reviewing legal responses to the human genome
project).
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promulgate rules delimiting the use and dissemination of genetic information, and to define legal obligations-of doctors, employers, insurers, researchers, and others-with reference to such rules. 4'
Models for these statutes stem from the world of commerce. Obligations to reveal or refrain from revealing information have long been central
to the ethic of the marketplace. Such rules have reflected, and presumed to
safeguard, the ideology of autonomous individuality by presuming that
once informed, social actors are equipped to make their own choices and to
effect their own bargains. So, for instance, rules concerned with the proof information are central to the governance of the
tection or dissemination
142
corporate world.
Other models on which the law now relies in regulating the new genetics stem from tort law, 143 and still others from the doctrine of informed
consent in medical contexts. 144 Legal responses to the new genetics have
largely involved the promulgation of rules that limit or preclude the use
and dissemination of genetic information.
A few courts, however, have reflected an opposite concern and in doing that, have begun to elaborate the construct of a genetic family. These
courts have ordered the revelation of genetic information. Their decisions
illustrate the limits of the larger effort to protect genetic privacy and sug-

gest that the law, despite its express goals, may facilitate a construct of
family that abrogates the autonomy of individual family members as certainly as it abrogates the possibility of traditional family life.
141. See supranote 131 and accompanying text..
142. Many securities laws rest on the notion that corporate morality depends centrally on the dissemination of information. See, e.g., Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1999). The rule, promulgated
pursuant to the grant of authority given to the Securities and Exchange Commission by Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means of instrumentality ofinterstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,...
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
143. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 34246 (Cal. 1976) (imposing
duty on psychologist to warn intended victim that psychologist's patient was threatening to kill her);
Calwell v. Hassan, 925 P.2d 422, 428-32 (Kan. 1996) (refusing to impose duty on physician to warn
patient with sleep disorder not to drive because no "special relationship" existed),
144. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (1972) (overturning directed verdicts for defendants in case brought by patient alleging failure of doctors to warn him adequately of risks of pending
surgery).
The doctrine of informed consent was comparatively unimportant to the doctor-patient relationship until the middle of the twentieth century. Jay Katz described "disclosure and consent" as "obligations alien to medical thinking and practice."
PATIENT 1 (1984).

JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND
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In short, legislatures responding to the new genetics have widely focused on protecting the privacy of the autonomous individual-the direct
subject of genetic testing and diagnosis. For the most part, legislatures
have not focused on the implications of the new genetics for familial, ethnic, and other groups that may be defined in genetic terms. More particularly, legislatures have largely ignored potential development of a construct
of genetic families. 4 5 Even more, the express legislative effort to safeguard individual privacy (arguably a necessary step in protecting against
harms that can effect groups defined in genetic terms) has been marked
with ambivalence. Resulting statutory schemes provide inadequate protection against the potential harmful consequences of the dissemination and
use of genetic information.
1. SafeguardingPrivacy

State" and federal 47 legislators have promulgated a set of diverse
rules, aimed at protecting privacy and precluding discriminatory uses of

genetic information adequately enough to still public alarm but not so
completely as to eviscerate the particularistic and varied goals of science,
government, and industry."4
145. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
146. See e.g., AR1z. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-448 to 20-448.02,20-1379 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998);
CAL. Civ. CODE § 56.17 (West Supp. 1999); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.7 (West Supp.
1999); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 742.405-.407, 10123.3-35, 10123.9, 10140, 10140.1, 10143, 10146, 1014810149.1, 10198.9, 10705, 11512.7-11517 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODEANN. §§ 33-15-2U
33-16-1(a), 33-16-1(k) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.372, 631.89, 632.746,
632.748 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998).
Over 150 bills involving genetic testing were considered by state legislatures in 1997. See Jagutis, supranote 139, at 435 (citing David Gollaher, All Can Use Gene Tests... Except PoorSreening
Helps Insurers and (Surprise-)Patients 'ith Risks and Money, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIOENCER, Jan.
11, 1998, at El).
147. Many bills were presented in the 105th Congress. None were passed. Dorothy C. Wertz reports that I10 bills with the phrase "privacy of genetic information" in them were considered by the
105th Congress. Dorothy C. Wertz, Legislative Update: Genetic Privaey Bills, 3 GNE LETTER 2,
February 1999, <http-//www.geneletter.org0299legslativeupdate.htm> (on file with author). In considering these bills, legislators disagreed about how to define "genetic information" and "genetic testing." See id
148. Some states prohibit discrimination only through use of genetic test results and not through use
of genetic information understood more broadly. Genetic information can be obtained in other vias,
such as through medical histories. See, e.g., TEX REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 9031 (West Supp. 1999)
(prohibiting discriminatory use of genetic test results but not of genetic information obtained from
medical histories).
Other statutes apply to certain sorts of insurance, but not to other sorts. See, eg., Ok'LA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 36, § 3614.1 OVest 1999) (prohibiting insurance companies from requesting or requiring
genetic tests from any individual with accident and health insuance policies). See also Kouitn-ay L
Pickens, Comment, Don 't Judge Me by *y Genes: A Survey ofFederalGeneticDiscriminationLegislation,34 TULSA LJ. 161, 169 & n.73 (1998) (noting Oklahoma legislatume's refusal to include limits
on other insurers' right to use or require genetic information in life insurance bill, and citing Statelnes
Oklahoma:PassesGenetic DiscriminationBill, AMERICAN POLMCAL NEVORK, May 28,1998, at 8).
Even New Jersey's Genetic Privacy Act, among the most comprehensive of state law prohibiting
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The legislative effort, as a whole, has been complicated by uncertainty
about whose freedom to protect as the interests of the citizenry clash with

the divergent interests of employers, insurers, healthcare professionals, and
researchers. Variations in statutes from state to state reflect different con-

clusions about how to balance conflicting
claims to liberty, including pri149
vacy, presented by interested parties.

In attempting to limit the risk inherent in allowing insurers, the
government, employers, and healthcare professionals and organizations to
use genetic information, legislators have depended on two broad ap-

proaches. The first defines individuals as owners of genetic information

pertaining to them. 50 This approach has been strongly opposed by representatives of the biotechnology industry."' Indeed, industry lobbyists persuaded Governor Christine Whitman to veto a bill that contained such a

provision." 2 Whitman's veto was aimed at the means the legislature had
selected to safeguard privacy-not at the aspiration per se.'53 Even repregenetic discrimination, does not protect people against discrimination by life insurance companies. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West 1998); see also Bob Groves, New Jersey Has Yet to Implement
Genetic Privacy Law: Health-Care Communi, Awaiting State Confidentiality Regulations, TE
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 29, 1998, at A5,available in LEXIS, News Library, Nirc File.
Some states prohibit discriminatory uses of genetic information by employers but provide
exceptions for genetic information thought to indicate a potential occupational hazard. See Pickens,
supra, at 170; Sally Lehrman, California Protects Workers with Predisposition to Diseases, BIo.
TECHNOLOGYNEWSWATCH, July 20, 1998, at 1,available in LEXIS, News Library, Blotec File.
Even more important, most people not insured by Medicare or Medicaid are insured by employment-related health insurance plans. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
these plans are exempt from state insurance laws. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(b) (1994). However,
under the so-called "deemer" clause, self-funded plans are not subject to state insurance rules. See
FURROW ET AL., supra note 118, at 815 (describing ERISA's savings clause and "deemer" clause).
149. In constitutional jurisprudence, privacy claims have been subsumed within the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty protection. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (noting "roots" of
"a right to personal privacy" in Fourteenth Amendment, and in several other Amendments).
150. See, e.g., COL. REv.STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1 104.7(1)(a) (West 1999) ("Genetic information is the
unique property of the individual to whom the information pertains.'); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1)
(Harrison 1998) ("Genetic information is the unique property of the individual tested.'); 1997 La. Acts
1418; see also Michael S. Yesley, ProtectingGenetic Difference, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 653, 657
(1998).
151. See Yesley, supra note 150, at 657. The National Law Journal noted in 1998 that defining
genetic information as individual property could interfere with the profits of biotechnology companies.
See Cloning Laws Are Overbroad,THE NAT'L LJ.,June 29, 1998, at A8.
152. The legislative vote on the bill, with the ownership provision intact, had been unanimous. See
A Plethoraof GeneticPrivacy Bills Floods State Legislatures,8 BioWORLD TODAY 69, Apr. 10, 1997,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File [hereinafter GeneticPrivacyBills].
Whitman justified her veto by noting that the creation of ownership interests in genetic information by those to whom the information pertains would impede scientific work. See Sandra N. Hurd,
States Restrict Employers' Use of Genetic Tests, EMPLOYMENT TESTING L. & POL'Y REP., Feb. 1997,
at 17, available in LEXIS, News Library, Emptst File.
The New Jersey Legislature amended the bill. It became law two months later without the provision defining genetic information as private property. See Whitman Signs Comprehensive Genetic
Privacy and Anti-Discrimination Bill, 22 HEALTH LEGIS. & REG. 47, Nov. 27, 1996, available In
LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
153. See supranote 149 (noting privacy claims as sub-category of liberty claims).
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sentatives of the biotechnology industry have approved of efforts to safeguard genetic privacy so long as the mechanisms used to accomplish that
end do not interfere significantly with the industry's scientific and commercial goals." 4
A second legislative approach to safeguarding genetic privacy has relied on the informed consent doctrine as an alternative to ownership
rules.' 55 The specifics of such statutes vary broadly. For instance, some
states have predicated genetic testing by insurers on the informed consent
of those tested, but have not precluded consideration of test results in insurance companies' decision making. 5 Other statutes, pertaining specifically to life insurers, compel insurance companies to obtain informed consent before conducting genetic tests, but do not preclude insurers from
withholding coverage from those who refuse to consent to testing or whose
test results indicate genetic predispositions to disease.'"
To many, the informed consent approach is preferable to others in that
it balances the interests of those anxious to collect or use genetic information against the interests of those anxious to safeguard genetic privacy.
The doctrine is attractive at least in part because it placates concerns about
variations of privacy while interfering less with the goals of industry and
science than rules defining genetic information as property. In fact, if not
in theory, informed consent rules often function largely as a "moral
58

trump.'
Moreover, the capacity of any informed consent rules to protect privacy are even less clear in contexts involving questions about genetic privacy than in many other medical contexts. In the current climate, in which
genetic essentialism'5 9 flourishes, consenting to the collection, use, and
communication of genetic information may prove to be tantamount to consenting to privacy's demise. This was suggested, though perhaps unwittingly, by the sponsors of The Genetic Confidentiality and Non Discrimi154. Carl Fedlbaunm, president of the Biotechnology Industry Organization, proclaimed in 1997:
"Genetic Privacy is essential to our industry, but we need to be very careful how genetic privacy laws

are written in order to protect research." Genetic PrivacyBills, supranote 152.
155. See, e.g., Yesley, supra note 150, at 664 (concluding that informed consent is adequate to

protect privacy in the context of genetic information, though not perhaps with regard to actual body
cells; and noting that "[t]he value of intangible genetic data about an individual is probably not comparable to the value of an individual's cells from which a commercial product is derived").
156. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 2612 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
157. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139(5) (West 1997). See also Yesley, supra note 150, at

658-59.
158. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role ofConsent In the Moraland Political
Visions ofFranz Kafika and RichardPosner,99 HARV. L REV. 384, 386 (1985). West has suggested,

in a different context, that informed consent is most likely to "insulatef[ ...situations from moral
criticism" thereby "render[ing] them, without more, morally attractive." Id
159. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus and Dorothy Nelkin define "genetic essentialism" as the view that

"personal traits are predictable and permanent, determined at conception, 'hard-wired' into human
constitution." Dreyfus & Nelkin, supra note 129, at 320-21.
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nation Act of 1997," an act that placed informed consent rules at its core.
In introducing the bill to the United States Senate, one of its sponsors described the human genome project as promising access to "the most private
information that any individual can have,. 6 and another sponsor described
the project as providing "a blueprint of a human being's most personal and
potent information.' 62
Those consenting to the revelation and use of genetic information are,
in effect, consenting to the communication of data that may be interpreted
to suggest personal proclivities, habits, inhibitions, daydreams, and intuitions, as well as the state of individuals' health, the state of their parents',
siblings', and children's health, and the mode of their deaths. Few consents proffered in such a context will be truly informed.
Even more, neither an approach that depends on ownership rules nor
one that depends on informed consent requirements protects against the
misuse of genetic information about one individual in contexts that may
harm others, defined as genetically similar. Genetic information can be
located at the level of the individual or of groups (familial," racial," ethnic, religious). Thus, neither an approach that defines genetic information
as property nor one that predicates genetic testing on informed consent can
thereby protect the privacy of others assumed likely to share that person's
genome. The implications of that concern become manifest in a few judicial decisions that rely on a construct of genetic families'65 and therein presume the locus of privacy to be the genetic family rather than its individual
members.
2. The Genetic Family: EvisceratingPrivacy

The most far-reaching of the decisions that elaborate the construct of a
genetic family is Safer v. Pack.66 In that case, a New Jersey court delim160. S.422, 105th Cong., §§ 101,201,302 (1997). The bill conditioned collection of DNA samples

for genetic analysis, see id.
§ 101, and dissemination ofgenetic information, see Id. § 201, on the written consent of the individual whose DNA was to be collected. The bill specified that an individual

consenting to disclosure of genetic information be informed about a variety of matters including the
identity of the person authorized to disclose, the "specific genetic information to be disclosed," the
identity of the entity to which the information would be disseminated, and the "purpose of the disclosure." Id § 302.
161. 143 CONG. R-c. 30, S2140 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
162. Id (statement of Sen. Dodd). The second sponsor announced an intention to balance the interests ofprivacy with those of industry by imposing "strict informed consent procedures." Id
163. See infra Part IV (discussing construct of genetic family). See also Silver, supra note 130, at

1857 n.224 (describing discrimination against family on basis of genetic information); Dreyfuss &
Nelkin, supra note 129, at 331 (noting that hereditary traits "often reduce to ethnic group membership").
164. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cr. 1998) (prohibiting testing ofAfrican American job applicants for sickle-cell trait).
165. See infra Part II.B.2 (considering construct of genetic family in judicial decisions).
166. 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
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ited a genetic family within which the notion of privacy, as understood in
the West for over 200 years, was essentially eviscerated. Safer, although
revolutionary for the construct of family on which it depended, reflected
existing case law in imposing a duty on a physician to reveal information
about a patient's genetic condition to family members.
In 1981, in Schroeder v. Perkel,167 almost a decade before the initiation
of the human genome project and over a decade before Safer arose, the
parents of Ann Schroeder sued their child's pediatrician. The parents argued that the doctor, in failing to inform them that their infant child suffered from cystic fibrosis, a genetic condition, had denied them the right to
make an "informed choice" about "whether to assume the risk of a second
child.""s They claimed that they had been denied their procreative right to
preclude the birth of additional children who might suffer from the same
illness. 169 Indeed, the couple, Marion and John Schroeder, had a second
child. That child, a1 boy
named Thomas, suffered, as did his older sister,
0
from cystic fibrosis. 7
The pediatricians defended themselves on the ground that the
Schroeders' infant daughter, Ann, was their patient, and, for that reason,
they owed no duty to the child's parents. 1 The New Jersey Supreme
Court disagreed:
A physician's duty thus may extend beyond the interests of a patient to members of the immediate family of the patient who may
be adversely affected by a breach of that duty. Here, the physicians had not only a duty to Ann, but an independent duty to Mr.
and Mrs. Schroeder to disclose to them that Ann suffered from
cystic fibrosis. The wrong allegedly committed by defendants was
the failure to disclose material information. The defendants should
have foreseen that parents of childbearing years, such as Mr. and
Mrs. Schroeder, would, in the absence of knowledge that Ann suffered from cystic fibrosis, conceive another child.' 72
Schroeder, decided before the availability of genetic tests for cystic fibrosis, 173 extended the reach of the law in permitting Marion and John
167.
168.
169.
170.

432 A.2d 834 (NJ. 1981).
Id. at 836.
See id.
See 1d.

171. See id. at 838.
172. Id. at 839-40. Justice Handler, in dissent, would have also recognized a causc-of-action in the
Schroeder's second-born child, Thomas, against the defendant-doctors. See Id. at 844 (Handler, J,
dissenting). The majority declined to recognize that cause-of-action because the Nev Jersey Supreme

Court had previously refused to recognize claims for wrongful life and diminished parental capacity,
and also because the Schroeders did not assert this claim on appeal. See Id. at 840.
173. See id. at 836 (stating that cystic fibrosis cannot be detected in a fetus, but could be detected in
a baby through the method known as the "sweat test").
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Schroeder to sue doctors whom they had engaged to treat not themselves,
but their child. The decision does not, however, upset common-sensical
understandings of a pediatrician's duties since, as a practical matter, the
doctor of an infant child must, and routinely does, communicate information about patient health and disease to the patient's parent or guardian.
Schroeder did, however, provide a precedent for Safer which required a
74
physician to reveal information about a patient to that patient's child.1
a. Pate v. Threlkel
Between Schroeder and Safer, the Florida Supreme Court decided Pate
v. Threlkel.17 5 The Pate court recognized a duty on the part of a defendant
doctor to provide explicit information about the consequences for family
members of a patient's genetic condition, and granted a third-party relative
standing to commence suit against the physician. 76 Thus, the court allowed Heidi Pate to bring suit against her mother's doctor, despite the fact
77
that Heidi had no professional relationship with that doctor.
The case was commenced in 1990, after Heidi Pate was diagnosed with
medullary thyroid carcinoma, a hereditary condition. 78 Three years earlier
Dr. James Threlkel had treated Heidi's mother for the same condition.
Although Heidi was not a patient of Dr. Threlkel, she argued that he and
the other defendants 179 should have informed Heidi's mother of the hereditary nature of the mother's disease.180 Heidi asserted that had she been
aware of the character of her mother's condition in 1987, her own condition would have been diagnosed at that time and would likely have been
curable.''
Dr. Threlkel asked the court to dismiss the complaint against him on
the ground that he owed no duty to Heidi Pate.1 82 In a brief to the Florida
Supreme Court, defendant Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinic, where
Heidi's mother had been a patient, and the Florida Board of Regents asserted:
There is no compelling medical, societal or public policy reason to
expand a physician's duty to third party non-patients. To do so
would fundamentally change the foundation of the physicianpatient relationship beyond which no court in Florida has gone.
174. See Safer v. Pack, 677 AId 1188, 1192 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Dlv. 1996).
175. 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995).
176. See id.at282.
177. See id.
178. See id. at279.
179. Heidi, along with her husband James Pate, who claimed loss of consortium, sued Dr. Threlkel
along with Dr. Pfaff and Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics. See Pate v. Threlkel, 640 So. 2d 183,
183 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
180. See id. at 183.
181. See id.
182. See id.at 184.
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Appellants' requested change would add an unpredictable and unmanageable burden on healthcare providers... for the heath and
welfare of people who are not patients of that healthcare provider.
183

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal of Florida agreed with the
defendants. The Supreme Court of Florida, however, reversed, concluding

that Heidi was not precluded from bringing suit by the lack of privity be-

tween herself and the defendant doctors and clinic. 18 Justice Wells, writing for the state supreme court, stated:
[W]hen the prevailing standard of care creates a duty that is obvi-

ously for the benefit of certain identified third parties and the physician knows of the existence of those third parties, then the physician's duty runs to those third parties. Therefore,... we hold that
privity does not bar Heidi Pate's pursuit of a medical malpractice
action ....
[U]nder the duty alleged in this case, a patient's children

fall within the zone of foreseeable risk. 85
Although the court allowed Heidi's suit to proceed despite the lack of a
professional relationship between herself and the defendants, the implica-

tions of the'holding were expressly limited. Heidi was allowed to bring
suit.18 6

She was not, however, free to argue that the defendants had a duty

183. Answer Briefs of Appellees Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. and Florida Board of

Regents at 7-8, Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995) (Nos. 92-02776,92-1277-CA).
184. See Pate, 661 So. 2d at282.

185. Id.
186. See id.Pate represents the first Florida decision to recognize the right of a fanily member to
bring suit against a physician whose patient suffered from a hereditary condition. The holding was not,
however, entirely unprecedented outside Florida. In a limited line of cases beginning with Tarasoffv.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), state courts began to impose a legal duty on
healthcare professionals to warn third-parties. Tarasoffimposed a duty on a psychotherapist %vhohad
failed to warn Tatiana Tarasoff that his patient, Prosenjit Poddar, had expressed an intention to kill
Tatiana. See id.at 345-47. The case was brought by Tatiana's parents after Tatiana was murdered by
Poddar. See id.at 340-41. Other cases have followed in otherjurisdictions. After Tarasoff,a number
of state courts imposed a duty on healthcare professionals to disclose medical information in
initiated by third parties. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Tenn. 1993) (imposing
duty on physician to warn that wife of patient with Rocky Mountain Spotted Fecvr was at risk of getting the illness; the suit was commenced by the patient's stepson after his mother died of the illness).
See also L.J. Deflos, Genomic Torts: The Lmv of the Fuhre-the Duty of Pi)-slclans to Disclose th1
Presence ofa Genetic Disease to the Relatives of Their Patientswith the Disease, 32 U.S.F. L REV.
105, 111-29 (1997) (reviewing "duty to warn" cases).
For the most part, courts have only applied the doctrine reluctantly. See, eg., Vause v. Bay
Med. Ctr., 687 So. 2d 256, 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (limiting Pate as precedent, by noting that
liability in cases involving a duty to disclose medical information is extended "in only very limited
circumstances absent privity between the patient and the doctor"). Moreover, in cases involving medical infobration, courts have rarely extended the duty beyond the requirement that the patient him or
herself be warned.
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to share genetic information about their patient with that patient's children
or with other relatives. The court wrote:
To require the physician to seek out and warn various members of
the patient's family would often be difficult or impractical and
would place too heavy a burden upon the physician. Thus, we emphasize that in any circumstances in which the physician has a duty
to warn of a genetically transferable
disease, that duty will be satis87
fied by warning the patient.1
b. Safer v. Pack
On this issue, the decision of the New Jersey appellate court in Safer v.
Pac' 88 broke with tradition. Safer extended to a doctor the obligation to
inform a patient's family-in particular, a patient's child-about a patient's genetic disease."8 9
Like Pate, Safer was commenced by a child of a physician's patient
against that physician. And like the plaintiff in Pate, the plaintiff in Safer
suffered from the hereditary condition for which her parent had been
treated.'"9 In 1990 Donna Safer was diagnosed with colon cancer.
Twenty-six years earlier, when Donna was ten-years old, her father, Robert
Batkin, died of the same illness. 9' In 1992, Donna brought suit against the
estate of Dr. George Pack, 192 who had treated Donna's father during the
seven years that Robert Batkin was ill.' 93
The trial court dismissed Donna Safer's complaint, concluding that a
physician had no "'legal duty to warn a child of a patient of a genetic
risk."" 9 4 Moreover, the trial court distinguished Donna's case from earlier
195
cases involving infectious diseases that threatened family members.
With genetic illnesses, the trial court explained, "the harm is already present within the non-patient child ... The patient is taking no action in which
to cause the child harm."'196 This conclusion reflects a more widespread
confusion about how legally to categorize genetic illnesses which, from
one perspective, exist from birth-indeed, before birth-but which may

In a 1979 decision, aNew Jersey court noted that in future cases, a court could be compelled to

consider the scope of the limits on physician-patient confidentiality. See McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d
500, 514 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
187. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282.
188. 677 A.2d 1188 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).

189. See id. at l192.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id. at 1190.
See id.
Dr. Pack died in 1969. See Id.
See id. at 1189-90.

194. Id. at 1190 (quoting trial court's decision).
195. See Deftos, supra note 186, at 132-34 (summarizing and analyzing "duty to disclose" cases).

196. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1191.
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manifest.

On appeal, a state appellate court disagreed with the trial court, and
defined genetic conditions to create a duty to warn because "the individual
or group at risk is easily identified. 198 The court explained: "[T]he duty

[is appropriately] seen as owed not only to the patient himself but.., it
also 'extend[s] beyond the interests of a patient to members of the immedi-

ate family
of the patient who may be adversely affected by a breach of that
199

duty."'
In this regard, the Safer court took express exception to the holding of
the Florida Supreme Court in Pate: "We decline to hold as the Florida Supreme Court did in Pate v. Threlkel... that, in all circumstances, the duty

to warn will be satisfied by informing the patient."200 The court explained
that even if evidence provided at trial showed that Robert Batkin had in-

structed Dr. Pack not to inform his family of the hereditary nature of his
condition, the doctor might be required to ignore those instructions. Especially, the court suggested, after Batkin's own death.20

The holding in Safer is both unprecedented and controversial.
It
differs from other cases in requiring a healthcare professional to warn a
family member about the condition of another, adult, family member. A
few cases, such as Schroeder, imposed a duty on physicians to warn pa-

tients' parents about the genetic conditions of their children or potential
children.20 3 Those cases do not redefine the scope of privacy within fa-

197. A Nebraska case, decided in 1994, expressly raised the issue of how to categorize genetic
conditions without the manifestation ofsymptomatology. See Katske v. Blue CrosslBlue Shield, 515
N.W.d 645 (Neb. 1994). In Katskee, the Nebraska Supreme Court decided that Sindie Kaiskee's
family history of ovarian and breast cancer rendered her ill (even though she did not have cancer) and
thus entitled her to coverage under her medical insurance policy for removal ofher utenis, ovaries, and
fallopian tubes. See id. at 651-52. In considering whether or not to categorize Katskee's condition as
an illness under the terms of her insurance policy, the court faced a series ofvexing questions about the
significance of time to the definition of illness. See Id. at 652-53. If, for instance, Katskee's familial
history rendered her "ill," then might not another patient with a similar history be excluded from medical insurance coverage on the grounds that she suffered from a pre-existing condition? See
at 653.
198. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192. Given the character of the proceeding as an appeal of a summary
judgment motion, the appellate court accepted the plaintiff's claims that when Dr. Pack treated Robert
Batkin, the prevailing standard of care required a doctor to warn of the hereditary character ofan illness
such as that from which Robert Batkin suffered. See id. at 1191.
199. Id. at 1192 (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839 (NJ. 1981)).
200. Id.
201. See id.at1193.
202. In 1996, New Jersey promulgated a genetic privacy law that allows physicians to warn relatives
of patients about a genetic condition only ifthe patient has consented to the disclosure or has died. See
Groves, supra note 148, at A05.
203. See, eg., Schroeder, 432 A.2d at 839-40 (imposing duty on child's doctor to warn parents of
hereditary nature of child's illness so that parents would have been able to make informed choice about
decision to have subsequent children). See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text (considering

Schroeder).
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does.20 4

Schroder reflects tradimilial contexts as dramatically as Safer
tional understandings of the parent-child relationship. In contrast, Safer, in
holding Dr. Threlkel responsible for informing a child about a parent's
condition, completely disrupts traditional understandings of the parentchild relationship.
Thus, Safer suggests something far more extraordinary than any of the
earlier cases. Safer is unusual, though not unique, among "duty to disclose" cases in restricting the reach of the shield that generally protects
defendants from suits by remote plaintiffs. 0 5 Safer is remarkable, however, insofar as it reconstructs the locus of familial privacy.
IV. THE FRAGMENTATION OF IDEOLOGY: PRIVACY, TRADITION,

AUTONOMY, AND THE "GENETIC FAMILY"
Safer depends on assumptions about the character of family connections-and thus about the locus of privacy in familial contexts-that are
foreign, though in different regards, to understandings of both traditional
families and of modem "families of choice." Safer assumes a family
within which each unit (each person) replicates every other unit, and within
which each unit (each person) replicates the larger family within which
these units co-exist.
In this, the genetic family constructed in Safer differs from the construct of the traditional family and from that of the modem family-ofchoice. It differs from the traditional family in that it does not prize hierarchy, holism, or community. Within the genetic family, any unit (any person) or combination of units can exist without reference to any others. In
distinction, each of the roles that constitute the traditional family become
meaningful only in light of the larger hierarchy of family roles. Equally,
the genetic family differs from the construct of a family composed of
autonomous individuals, linked together through choice and design.
Within the modem family, the unit of value is the individual. In distinction, the unit of value in the genetic family is the whole (itself variously
defined) as well as the parts (insofar as they mirror the whole and each
other). In the genetic family, the private individual, the locus of social and
thus familial value in families-of-choice, is displaced through its replication in the larger genetic family, and in each of that family's other individuals.
204. Commentators have pondered the extent of the duty imposed by Safer. One group of authors
asks whether Safer suggests a duty on physicians to inform patients (and the families of patients) suffering from genetic conditions about new tests and treatments over time. See Gary N. McAbee ct al.,
Physician'sDuty to Warn Third PartiesAbout the Risk of Genetic Diseases,102 PEDIATRICS 140 July
1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 17465264.

205. See Deftos, supra note 186, at 107 ("Genomic concepts ofprivity and privilege will dissolve
the third-party shield that often protected defendants from remote plaintiffs.').
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A. The Locus of Privacy
Differences between the construct of a genetic family and other constructs of family are especially significant with regard to claims about privacy. The genetic family undermines privacy associated traditionally with
family autonomy as well as privacy associated with individual autonomy.
Within the traditional family, understood as a small universe of fixed,
hierarchically structured roles, the assumed locus of privacy was the familial whole, represented by the family's patriarchal head. The law reflected that view through its commitment to preserving family autonomy 2 s
against state intervention. 0 7 In fact, that task generally involved safeguarding the patriarch against the discontents of other family members.2 "
The handling of private matters within familial contexts was mediated by
the hierarchy of roles and relationships. The right of a husband to know
about his wife, and of parents to know about their children, was not understood as a right belonging to autonomous individuals, but as a right inherent to the family as a structured whole. Family law widely reflected this
aspect of traditional family privacy. It was reflected as well in the few
cases brought before the 1970s involving questions about the scope of a
third-party's right to disclose information about one family member to another. In 1963, a Louisiana court held that a doctor and two insurance
companies were not obligated to protect a woman's medical records from
her husband's review. 2°9 In so holding, the court explained that a 'wife's
privacy is her husband's privacy in that he is "head and master of the
community.""21 Similarly, in 1966, a New York court recognized the right
of a physician to reveal medical information about his patient to her hus-

206. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1963) (refusing to intervene in
dispute initiated by a wife alleging that husband failed to provide adequately for her).

207. While invoking the notion of"family autonomy," the law, in fact, intervened in family matters
in a wide variety of contexts. Among other things, the law defined marriage, delimited the duties of
spouses to each other, and outlined the scope of parental authority. As Frances Olsen has written,
"[s]tate intervention in the family is an ideological, not an analytic concept" Frances Olsen, T-- My),th
of State Intervention in the Fantily,in FAMfLY MATERs 277, 281 (Martha Minow ed., 1993).
208. In McGuire, the wife complained that the husband "was the boss of the house and his word was
law." McGuire, 59 N.W.2d at 337. Despite the husband's substantial resources, the couple's home
was "not equipped with a bathroom, bathing facilities, or inside toileL" Id. There was no kitchen sink,
and according to the wife the "pipeless furnace" had not worked properly for a number ofyears. See Id.
at 337-38. The court refused to entertain the wife's complaints about her husband even though, in the
court's view, the husband's behavior was unimpressive. See d The court concluded: -The living
standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts to determiin, even
though the husband's attitude toward his wife, according to his wealth and circumstances, leaves little
to be said in his behalf" Id. at 342. The case must be interpreted in light of the difficulty of obtaining
a divorce as a resident of Nebraska in the early 1950s.
209. See Tooley v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617,618 (La. CL App. 1963).
210. Id Ironically, the revelation of the wife's medical records to the husband in Too!ey assisted the
husband in obtaining a divorce. See Defios, supranote 186, at 113 (discussing Tooley).
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band.
In the last three decades of the twentieth century, the law began to assume a different view of the right to privacy in family contexts. As society
replaced families understood as hierarchical, holistic communities with
families understood as associations of autonomous individuals, the locus of
familial privacy shifted from the familial community, represented by its
pater, to individuals, viewed
as autonomous agents of moral authority.
212
The law reflected this shift.
In 1972 in Eisenstadt v. Baird,213 the Supreme Court symbolized and
furthered the recognition of individuals within families as the locus of
value, and thus of privacy, in a decision that extended the right to use contraception from married couples to single people. In Eisenstadt,the Court
openly disaffirmed any understanding of families as more than the individuals who compose them.214 The Court proclaimed: "Ifthe right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen t ally
' ' 5 affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."

211. See Curry v. Corn, 277 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). See also Deflos, supra note
186, at 113 (discussing Cuny). Curry was brought by a woman against her doctor. See Curry, 277
N.Y.S.2d at 470. The wife claimed that she was "injured in mind and body" after her doctor revealed
information about her medical condition to her husband. Id. The parties were apparently divorcing,
and the wife claimed that the information of concern was transmitted to the husband "'with the Intent
and expectation'" that he would use it in the pending divorce action. Id (quoting pleadings). The New
York court asserted that in such a case, as before a marriage, parties have a "right to know the existence

of any disease which may have bearing on the marital relation." Id. at 471. However, the court cited
with approval the conclusion of the Louisiana court in Tooley that a husband has a right to know about
his wife's medical condition because .".[hle is head and master of the community and responsible for Its
debts.'" Id. at 472 (quoting Tooley, 154 So. 2d at 618).
212. For the most part, this shift has implicated adults within families far more than children or the
parent-child relationship, though to a degree the law has begun to recognize children as autonomous
individuals in at least a limited set of circumstances.
Confusions about children and about the parent-child relationship are widespread in contemporary legal responses to the family. In some cases, the law has refused to recognize children's autonomy. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620-21 (1979) (upholding Georgia statute allowing parent
or guardian to effect "voluntary commitment" of child to state mental hospital). In other cases, the law
has recognized the autonomy of minors at least to a limited extent See, e.g., Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 650 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional Massachusetts statute that failed to provide minor girls
seeking abortion with judicial by-pass option to parental veto); Gregory K. v. Ralph K., No. C192-5126,
1992 WL 551488 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 20, 1992) (granting child standing to initiate termination of his
biological mother's parentage), rev'd sub nom. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993). The trial court opinion in GregoryK, although reversed on appeal, was widely publicized
and debated. The story even became the subject of a made-for-television movie. See Andrew L. Shapiro, Children in Court-TheNew Crusade,NATION, Sept. 27, 1993, at 301,301.
213. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
214. See id. at453.
215. Id at438 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
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followed, 2 16

suggest a displacement of
Eisenstadt,and other cases that
traditional notions of family privacy. In subsequent decades, the stress on
though, at the same
individual privacy within family law has intensified,
2 17
time, the effort has been hedged with ambivalence.
The construct of the genetic family precludes both the privacy of the
autonomous individual and that of the familial whole, associated with a
patriarchal head. Information about any member of a genetic family is
indistinct from information about any other. In consequence, privacy vanishes. Safer' and to some, though a lesser, extent Pate,3 9 suggest that
within families, secrets are obsolete. Neither the prerogatives of the paler
familitas nor the privileges of autonomous individuality can protect secrets
against the outside professional, ordered by court decree, to tell each about
the others. In short, the perceived links between Donna Safer and her father threaten traditional understandings of family. But, equally, they
threaten the family defined as a collection of autonomous individuals.
Moreover, the obligation imposed on Dr. Pack to provide Donna Safer
with information about her father, was unconnected to any other understanding of the relationship that did or might have pertained between the
daughter and her father. It was predicated only on the possibility that
Donna and her father shared a genetic trait making them both susceptible to
colon cancer. The links connecting Donna to her father--or any member of
a genetic family to any other-are a-moral links that neither define nor
depend upon the scope and meaning of social relationships among family
members.
The genetic family defined in Safer is a unit almost completely unfamiliar to family law z as it is unfamiliar to society more broadly. It depends neither on the strictures and presumptions of tradition nor on the
choices of modernity. It exists outside both history and time. It reflects the
amorality of the genes that define its scope. Within family settings, it
threatens tradition and modernity far more broadly than either threatens the
other.
216. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (granting limited right to abortion); Carey v.
Population Sew.. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 699 (1977) (holding unconstitutional New York statute forbidding sale of nonpharmaceutical contraceptives to minors); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 69 (1976) (precluding states from granting to woman's husband right to veto decision to abort a
pregnancy). But see infra note 217.
217. Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court returned to the rhetoric oftraditional family privacy
in a number of decisions implicating the rights of family members vis-a-vis each other and the state.
See, e.g, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy statute and
finding no connection between the "claimed constitutional right of homosLcuals to engage in acts of
sodomy" and traditional privacy protections); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1999)
(upholding California statute that presumes mother's husband to be father of her child).
218. See supra Part H.B.2.b.
219. See supraPart Ill.B.2.a.
220. Safer was not decided as a "family law" case. However, the decision has Important implications for the potential scope offamilial relationships.
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B. Varieties ofFamily Ideology
Arguably, the conceptual challenge need not become real. In resolving
the dispute brought to court by Donna Safer against her father's doctor, the
New Jersey court was concerned with Donna's family in one essential regard-that relevant to the specific medical condition from which Donna
suffered and from which her father, before her, had suffered. Arguably, the
construct of the genetic family on which Safer depends carries relevance in
only a limited set of contexts and thus need not compete with, or upset,
alternative conceptions of family. It is imaginable that the conceptual contradictions between the construct of the genetic family and other constructs
of family will be resolved through contextualization. But that seems unlikely.
It becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish conclusively between
medicalized contexts and other contexts. The ideology of genetic inheritance not only affects ill people, it also affects people as they seek employment, apply for health insurance, and consider potential spouses.22 1
Moreover, the concept of medicalization assumes increasing importance
within the society,tm as a wider and wider set of habits, talents, and behaviors are popularly associated with a genetic base. Moreover, the concept of genetic disease becomes increasingly salient in medicalized contexts.
The genetic family delimited in Safer 2' merges, in a host of actual
contexts with other constructs of family. For example, a case involving
gestational motherhood might involve preimplantation genetic testing and
diagnosis. Thus, the intentional and gestational mother might be provided
with genetic information about her future child, and inevitably as well,
about that child's genetic family. In such a case, would the woman denominated as "mother" under Johnson and its progeny" 4 be obliged to inform another mother-a genetic mother-that she, her parents, her siblings, or her future children are predisposed to genetic illness? 225 Similarly, a case involving genetic testing for a familial condition might alert
geneticists that a man is not the genetic father of his child.226 When con-

221. Within certain communities of Orthodox Jews, prospective spouses are advised to be tested for
tay-sacks disease before marriage. See Lee S. Goldsmith, Science Outpaces the Law in Genetic Testing, N.J. LJ., May 5, 1997, at 32.
222. See FINLER, supra note 13, at 251-52 (describing concept of"medicalization" as a "twentieth

century phenomenon").
223. See supraPart III.B.2.b.
224. See supra Part II.B.
225. See Olson v. Children's Home Soc'y, 252 Cal. Rptr. 11, 12-13 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding adop-

tion agency not liable to genetic mother of child for failure to disclose to her information about genetic
condition of her biological child).

226. Asked about just such a case, two-thirds of geneticists questioned in the United States reported
that they would refrain from informing the man. See Dorothy C. Wertz, Society and the Not-So-New
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texts merge, where does one set of rules end and the other begin?
The question holds broad significance for a family law system that
relies heavily on context to mediate conflicting rules about family life. So,
for instance, the Pennsylvania court in Miscovich self-consciously refused
to consider facts about biological paternity in order to presume a child's
'
mother's husband to be the child's father.m
Yet, in other sorts of family
disputes in which paternity is at issue-contexts, for instance, in which a
child's parents are unmarried-courts rely without reservation on the resuits of DNA fingerprinting to impose support obligations on biological
fathers, even in the absence of any social relationship between the biological father and his child or betveen that father and the child's mother?28
Similarly, the California court in Johnson concluded that in contexts of
gestational surrogacy and gestational motherhood-contexts in which the
courts perceived a biological "tie"--reference to maternal intention can
substitute for biology in determining, and in anchoring, motherhood.2 9
And even in Buzzanca which appears to test Johnson's limits by relying on
intention to denominate a biological third party as a child's mother, the
context-that of gestational surrogacy-appears to limit the implications of
the decision.2 0 The law can thus apparently rely, at least for a time, on the
construct of intentional maternity without openly challenging more familiar
notions of maternity, grounded in what was once called simply "biology."
Yet, it is unlikely that contextualization can long mediate among such
conflicting presumptions about family life. The construct of the genetic
family becomes especially problematic to a legal system hesitant to abandon a conception of families-however composed-that implicitly associates family life with moral ends.
The genetic family insists only on one thing--the recognition of biological information. In that, it upsets a society and a legal order committed
to the position that autonomous choice can sustain a moral frame within
which family life is distinguished from life in other social domains. Thus,
the construct of the genetic family poses several specific challenges to
other constructs of family.
Although some constructs of family privilege biological over social

Genetics: What Are We Afraid of? Some Future Predictionsfrom a Social Scientist, 13 J. CONEitP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 299, 314 (1997).

227. See Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726,730 (Pa. Super. CL 1997), aft'd,720 A.2d 764 (Pa.
1998), cert. deniea4 119 S. CL 1757 (1999).
228. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that Texas violated Equal Protection Clause by denying children of unmarried parents the right to same sort ofpaternal support given children of married parents); Nebraska ex reL J.R. v. Mendoza, 481 N.V.2d 165,

170-74 (Neb. 1992) (allowing state to sue biological father for support despite willingness of stepfather to acknowledge paternity).
229. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782-83 (Cal. 1993).
230. See In re Marriage of Buz7anca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280,293 (Cal. CL App. 1998). See also supra
notes 85-97 and accompanying text (considering Buzzanca).
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dimensions, and others privilege social over biological dimensions, all but
the genetic family, assume the familial content of the relationships specified. So, for example, the court in Miscovich privileged the social over the
biological dimensions of family, therein presuming a biological fact in the
effort to preserve a traditional understanding of family."l And the courts
in Johnson, McDonald,and Buzzanca privileged intention over biology in
order to ensure loving family relationships. 2 In contrast, the court in
Safer, in requiring Dr. Pack to inform Donna of her father's, and thus of
her own, illness, assumed nothing about the relation that might or should
pertain between the daughter and her father. 3
Similarly, the genetic family challenges other constructs of family in
that it does not depend on, and does not reflect, distinctions between a
world of the home and a world of the marketplace. Or more accurately, it
is indifferent to distinctions between these social domains. In other contexts, courts have predicated family ties on money and bargain, but have
insisted that families, once formed, not assimilate life at home with life at
work. That insistence is patent in Miscovich. There, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concluded that, once denominated and reflected in behavior, the paternal relationship continues as a matter of law even if the man
has no biological connection to the child, and even if the man has terminated the social relationship between himself and the child. 4 Similarly,
and quite as insistently, courts deciding gestational surrogacy and gestational motherhood cases have struggled to deflect the implication that
grounding parenthood on intention assimilates life at home to life at work.
Thus, in Johnson, for instance, the court concluded that Crispina Calvert,
because she was the intending mother, would be a good mother. 235 The
genetic family, in contrast, is unconcerned with distinguishing the world of
home from the world of work.
Finally, and perhaps most significant, the construct of the genetic family does not place social value firmly at the level of the autonomous individual or at the level of the communal whole. It is concerned with neither
the familial choices of individual family members nor with structured rules
and ordered forms that delimit the scope of "traditional" family life.
Within the genetic family, social value can be placed variously at the level
of particular people or at the level of larger familial, ethnic, or racial
groups.
The ideological implications of the construct of a genetic family are
broad and startling. As a conceptual matter, the genetic family-or the
231.
232.
233.
234.

See Miscovich, 688 A.2d at 730.
See supra Part II.B.
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See Miscovich, 688 A.2d at 730.

235. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (concluding that children's Interests will
be served by parents who intendedto raise those children).
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genetic race or ethnic group-replicates its units, each of which replicates
each other unit. Thus, any level of value is potentially as significant as any
other. In this, the genetic family may presage unintended consequences in
a world that prizes autonomous individuality-the subordination of the
individual to the whole. That result, the French anthropologist Louis
Dumont has explained, "results from the attempt, in a society where individualism is deeply rooted and predominant, to subordinate it to the primacy of the society as a whole. ' 2 6 Within such a universe, privacy, as
defined for over two centuries in the West, would vanish altogether. Safer,
quite unintentionally it would seem, intimates that possibility.
V. CONCLUSION

Family law reflects the fragmentation of family ideology. Largely, that
process occurs in protection of individualism and choice. Insofar as the
right to choose is now presumed to serve variously the interests of modernity or of tradition, the debate about family has become a debate about selfconscious choices.
As society has endeavored to define families, first without supernatural
anchors, and then without natural anchors, a commitment-not always
merely rhetorical-to the preservation of a traditional notion of family survives. Thus lawmakers assume that the mode through which families are
created bears no inevitable consequence for the relationships that will pertain among members of the families that result.2 7 They assume that family
members can choose modernity or that they can choose tradition238 and
thereby ensure the preservation of families as penianently solidary as
those assumed to have existed before modernity disrupted enduring community. Further, they assume that families can be anchored in biology, in
love, in intentions, or in all at once.
For the most part, the technological and practical consequences of the
new genetics, including gestational surrogacy and DNA fingerprinting,
have furthered social and legal readiness to fragment the ideology of family in deference to autonomous choice. In this, the law relies variously on
the unanchored elements of an ideology once taken to have defined traditional families. That reliance masks the extent of family law's service to
individualism and choice.
236. Louis DtnMoNr, HoMo HImRARcHIcUs 12 (1977) (emphasis omitted).
237. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (describing judicial reliance on parental inten-

tion as fimilial anchor).
238. In 1997, Louisiana gave couples planning marriage the option of choosing "covenat marriage"

and thereby agreeing that marriage can only be terminated "when there has been a complete and total
breach of the marital covenant commitment" 1997 La. Acts 1380. That statute indicates the fragility
of the effort it represents. Once a mode of domestic life is predicated expressly on choice, any one
choice can easily be displaced by other choices.
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The limits of family law's ability to disguise-or at least to blur-the
centrality of individualism and choice are tested as researchers report
cloning human DNA in the ova of cattle, 239 as university women of a certain height and intelligence are offered astronomical sums to give their ova
241
to others, 240 and as hospitals set up "adoption plans" for frozen embryos.
Even as the law's ability to sustain the illusion of preserving tradition while
serving modernity wanes, other possibilities emerge.
At the edges of a broad commitment to freedom, and thus choice, the
law faces the medicalized family, and begins to elaborate its variant: the
genetic family. At least in the first instance, this family serves neither individualism nor choice. It reflects the amorality of the DNA through
which it is delimited, and to which it can be reduced.242 Unlike the notion
of biogenetic substance as traditionally defined, DNA is indifferent to the
content of family life. This construct of family differs from others in abandoning even the pretense that contemporary families should be modeled on
nostalgic images of traditional families within which, it is presumed, enduring love and absolute loyalty were assured.
American law may not long continue to provide-at least not sanguinely-for a construct of genetic family that threatens individualism as
forcefully as it threatens holistic community. But the construct of the genetic family suggests that ultimately the debate about tradition and modernity-the contemporary debate about family-could find its apparent antagonists joined in opposition to a construct of family that precludes them
both and that undermines the very notion of a domestic sphere.
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